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of ancient knowledge which is extant, and by dint of rumination to have filled his mind and saturated himself with the
thoughts and feelings of the ancients.
To him they are not phantasms, butintimate associates. He
lives with them in the isolated home of the tribe and enters
into the mysterious communion with the domestic gods who
still take part in the necessitudes of the family. A companion of the ancients, his remarks and allusions teem with disclosures of their character, life and habits, and open vistas
into the world of antiquity. No modem mind concentrated
in business could abound in maturer or more fertile suggestions about practical affairs than de Coulanges in the fecundity
and ripeness of his reflection about prehistoric man. As a
Frenchman, he does not forget the art of presentation: each
chapter is pictured in itself; and represents a phase of thought
reflected by one aspect of life, the variety and finish, the epigrammatic terseness of an artist. Successive chapters develop difficult though connected views which enlarge the tableau,
and the epochs are rounded off to the completeness of miniature books. The introduction of Christianity and its effect
upon ancient life appropriately terminate the series of revolutions which in the lapse of time the race has undergone in the
expansion of thought.
JAMs PAISONS.
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UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. WILKINSON.
The assured, In a life policy, inreply to the question, had she ever had a serious
personal injury, answered no. She had, ten years before, fallen from a tree. The
criteria of a serious personal injury considered.
This Is not to be determined exclusively by the impressions of the matter at
the time, but its more or less prominent influence on the health, strength, and
longevity of the party is to be taken into account, and the jury are to decide
from these and the nature of the injury whetlier it was so serious as to make its
non-disclosure avoid the policy.
Insurance companies who do business by agencies at a distance from their
principal place of business are responsible for the acts of the agent within the
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general scope of the business intrusted to his care, and no limitations of his
authority will be binding on parties with whom he deals which are not brought
to their knowledge.
Hence, when these agents, in soliciting insurance, undertake to prepare the
application of the insured, or make any representations to the insured as to
the character or effect of the statements of the application, they will be regarded, in doing so, as the agents of the insurance companies, and not of the insured.
This principle is rendered necessary by the manner in which these agents are
sent over the country by such companies, and stimulated by them to exertions
in effecting insurance, which often lead to a disregard of the true principles of
insurance as well as'fair dealing.
In such cases the insurers cannot protect themselves under instructions to
their agents, that they are only agents for the purpose of receiving and transmitting the application and the premium.
Therefore, where the agent had inserted in the application for life insurance
a representation of the age of the mother of the assured at the time of her
death, which was untrue, but which the agent himself obtained from a third
person, and inserted without the assent of the assured, it was the act of the
company, and not of the assured, and did not invalidate the policy.
To permit verbal testimony to show how this was done by the agent does not
contradict the written contract, though the application was signed by the
party. It proceeds on the ground that it was not his statement, and that the
insurance company, by the acts of their agent 1i the matter, are estopped to
set up that it is the representation of the assured.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Iowa.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
M LLER J.--This was an action on a policy of insurance
obtained by defendant in error on the life of his wife from
the corporation which is here as plaintiff.
The making of the policy and the death of the wife being
admitted, the defendant below assumed the burden of a defense, which rested on his wife from the falsehood of certain
answers to questions found in the application of plaintiff.
By the terms of the policy it became void if any of those
representations proved to be untrue. The plea of defendant
sets up some ten or twelve of these responses as false, but the
questions presented here relate to bat two of these.
In answer to interrogatory No. 9, "Has the party ever had
any serious illness, local disease, or personal injury; if so, of
what nature, and at what age?" the parties answered "cNo."
In regard to this, defendant asserted that in the year 1862,
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some five or six years before the application was made, and
when the wife was about fourteen years old, she had been
seriously injured by a fall from a tree.
Under a rule of practice in the state courts of Iowa, adopted by the Circuit Court of that district, the judge required the
jury to respond to the following interrogatory:
"Did Malinda Jane Wilkinson (the wife), in the year 1862,
receive a serious personal injury by falling from a tree?" to
which they answered, "Yes; injured, not seriously."
As the defendant concedes that, to defeat the action, the
injury must have been serious, the response of the jury would
seem to be conclusive. But the counsel for defendant argue
that the jury were misled in making this response by the
instruction of the court on that subject, and by the further
question which it propounded to them in regard to the same
matter. This other question is thus stated in the record:
"Were the effects of such fall temporary, and had these effects
wholly passed away without influencing or affecting her subsequent health, or length of life, prior to the time when the
application for insurance in this case was taken?" To this the
jury answered, Yes.
And on this branch of the case the court said to the jury
that, if the effects of the.fall were temporary, and had entirely
passed away before the application was taken, and if it did
not affect her health or shorten her life, then the non-disclosure of the fall is no defense to the action. On the other
hand, if the effects of the fall were not temporary, and remained when the application was taken, or if the fall affected
the general health, or was so serious that it might affect, the
health or shorten life, that the non-disclosure would defeat
recovery, although the failure to mention the fall was not
intentional or fraudulent.
It is insisted by counsel for defendant that if the injury was
considered serious at the time, it is one which must be mentioned in reply to the interrogatory, and that whether any further
inquiry is expedient on the subject of its permanent influence
on the health, is for the insurer to determine before making
insurance. But there are grave and obvious difficulties in this
construction. The accidents resulting in personal injuries,
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which at the moment are considered by the parties serious,
are so very numerous that it would be almost impossible for
a person engaged in active life to recall them at the age of
forty or fifty years; and if the failure to mention all such injuries must invalidate the policy, very few would be sustained
where thorough inquiry is made into the history of the party
whose life is the subject of insurance. There is, besides, the
question of what is to be considered a serious injury at the
time. If the party gets over it completely, without leaving
any ill consequence, in a few days, it is clear that the serious
aspect of the case was a mistake. Is it necessary to state the
injury and explain the mistake to meet the requirements of
the policy?
On the other hand, when the question arises, as in this case,
on a trial, the jury, and not the insurer, must decide whether
the injury was serious or not. In deciding this, are they to
reject the evidence of the ultimate effect of the injury on the
party's health, longevity, strength, and other similar considerations? This would be to leave out of view the essential
purpose of the inquiry, and the very matters which would
throw most light on the nature of the injury, with reference
to its influence on the insurable character of the life proposed.
Looking, then, to the purpose for which the information is
sought by the question, and to the difficulty of answering
whether an injury was serious, in any other manner than by
reference to its permanent or temporary influence on the
health, strength and longevity of the party, we are of opinion
that the court did not err in the criterion by which it directed
the jury to decide the interrogatory propounded to them.Wikinson v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 Iowa.
The other answer which defendant atledges to have been
false is made to an inquiry as to the age of the mother at the
time of her death, and the disease of which she died.
The application shows that it was answered that she died
at forty of a fever. Evidence was given by defendant tending to prove that she died much younger of consumption.
In avoidance of this plaintiff was permitted to prove that
the agent of the insurance company, who took down the
answers of the applicant and his wife to all the interroga-
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tories, was told by both of them that they knew nothing
about the cause of the mother's death or her age at the time;
that the wife 'was too young to know or remember anything
about it, and the husband had never known her. But that
there was present, at the time the agent was taking the application, an old woman, who said she had knowledge on that
subject, and that the agent questioned her for himself, and
from what she told him he filled in the answer which is now
alleged to be untrue, without its truth being affirmed or assented to by plaintiff or the wife. The jury find all this in
their special verdict, and also find that the mother died at the
age of twenty-three years, and did not die of consumption.
The husband and wife had both been slaves, and it is found
that the applicant did not know when the application was
signed how the answer to this question had: been filled in.
And on this subject the court instructed the jury that if the
applicant did not know at what age her mother died, and did
not state it, and declined to state, it, and that her age was in.
8erted by the agent upon statements made to him by others
in answer to inquiries he made of them, and upon strength of
his own judgment, based upon data thus obtained, it was no
defense to the action to show that the agent was mistaken,
and that the mother died at the age of twenty-three years.
To the introduction of the, 9ral testimony regarding the
action of the ag4t, and to the instructions of the court on
that subject the defendant excepted; and assigns the ruling
of the court as an error on the ground that it permitted the
written contract to be contradicted and varied by parol testimony.
The great value of the rule of evidence here invoked cannot be easily overestimated. As a means of protecting those
who are honest, accurate, and prudent in making their contracts, against fraud and false swearing, against carelessness
and inaccuracy, by furnishing evidence of what was intended
by the parties, which can always be produced without fear of
change or liability to misconstruction, the rule merits the
eulogies it has received. But experience has shown that in
reference to these very matters the rule is not perfect. The
written instrument does not always represent the intention of
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both parties, and sometimes it fails to do so as to either; and
where this has been the result of accident, or mistake, or fraud,
the principle has been long recognized that under proper
circumstances, and in an appropriate proceeding, the instrument may be set aside or reformed, as best suits the purposes
of justice.
A rule of evidence adopted by the courts as a protection
against fraud and false swearing would, as was said in regard
to the analogous rule known as the statute of frauds, become
the instrument" of the very fraud it was intended to prevent
if there did not exist some authority to correct the universality of its application. It is upon this principle that courts
of equity proceed in giving the relief just indicated; and
though the courts, in a common law action, may be more cir.
cumscribed in the freedom with which they inquire into the
origin of written agreements, such an inquiry is not always
forbidden by the mere fact that the party's name has been
signed to the writing offered in evidence against him.
In the case before us a paper is offered in evidence against
the plaintiff containing a representation concerning a matter
material to the contract on which the suit is brought, and it
is not denied that he signed the instrument, and that the representation is untrue. But the parol testimony makes it clear
beyond a question that this party did not intend to make that
representation when he. signed the paper, and did not know
he was doing so, and, in fact, had refused to make any statement on that subject. If the writing containing this representation had been prepared and signed by the plaintiff in his
application for a policy of insurance on the life of his wife,
and if the representation complained of had been inserted by
himself, or by some one who was his agent alone in the matter,
and forwarded to the principal office of the defendant corporation, and acted upon as true, by the officers of the company,
it is easy to see that justice would authorize them to hold him
to the truth of the statement, and that as they had no part in
the mistake which he made, or in the making of the instrument which did not truly represent what he intended, he
should not, after the event, be permitted to show his own mistake or carelessness to the prejudice of the corporation.
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If,however, we suppose the party making the insurance to
have been an individual, and to have been present when the
application was signed, and soliciting the assured to make the
contract of insurance, and that the insurer himself wrote out
all these representations, and was told by the plaintiff and his
wife that they knew nothing at all of this particular subject
of inquiry, and that they refused to make any statement about
it, and yet knowing all this, wrote the representation to suit
himself, it is equally clear that for the insurer to insist that
the policy is void because it contains this statement, would be
an act of bad faith and of the grossest ,injustice and dishonesty. And thle reason for this is that the representation was
not the statement of plainti4l and that the defendant knew it
was not when he made the 'contract; and that it was made by
defendant, who procured plaintiff's signature thereto.
It is in precisely such cases as this that courts of law in
modern times have introduced the doctrine of equitable estoppels, or, as it is sometimes called, estoppels in pais. The
principle is that where one*party has by his representations
or his conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give
him an advantage which it would be against equity and good
conscience for him to assert, he would not in a coiurt of justice
be permitted to avail himself of that advantage. And although
the cases to which this principle is to be applied are not as
well defined as .could be wished, the -general doctrine is well
understood and is applied by courts of law as well as equity
where the technical advantage thus obtained is set up and relied on to defeat the ends of justice or establish a dishonest
claim. It has been applied to the precise class of cases of the
one before us in numerous well considered judgments bJy the
courts in this country. Plum v. Cataraugus Ins. Co., 18 N.
York 392; Rowley v. Empire Ins. Co., 3.6 New York 550;
Saving Ban v. Charter Oaj Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 526; Combs
v. The Hannibal F. &. ff. Ins. Co., 43 Missouri 148.
Indeed, the doctrine is so well understood and so often enforced that, if in the transaction we are now considering, Ball,
the insurance agent, who made out the application, had been
in fact the underwriter of the policy, no one would doubt its
applicability to the present case. Yet the proposition admits
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of as little doubt that if Ball was the agent of the insurance
company, and not of the plaintiff, in what he did in filling up
the application, the company must be held to stand just as he
would if he were the principal.
Although the very well considered brief of counsel for plaintiff in error takes no issue on this point, it is obvious that the
soundness of the court's instructions must be tested mainly by
the answer to be given to the question, Whose agent was
Ball in filling up the application?
This question has been decided differently by courts of the
highest respectability in cases precisely analogous to the present. It is not to be denied that the application, logically considered, is the work of the assured, and if left to himself or to
such assistance as he might select, the person so selected
would be his agent, and he alone would be responsible. On
the other hand, it is well known, so well that no court would
be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that insurance companies organized under laws of ono State, and having in that
State their principal business office, send these agents all over
the land, with directions to solicit and procure applications
for policies, furnishing them with printed arguments in favor
of the value and necessity of life insurance, and of the special
advantages of the corporation which the agent represents.
They pay these agents large commissions on the premiums
thus obtained, and the policies are delivered at their hands to
the assured. The agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to activity in procuring contracts, and the party
who is in this manner induced to take out a policy rarely sees
or knows anything about the company or its officers by whom
it is issued, but looks to and relies upon the agent who has
persuaded him to effect insurance as the full and complete representative of the company, in all that is said and done in
making the contract. Has he not a right to so regard him ?
It is quite true that the reports of judicial decisions are
filled with the efforts of these companies, by their counsel, to
establish the doctrine that they can do all this and yet limit
their responsibility for the acts of these agents to the simple
receipt of the premium and delivery of the policy, the argu-
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ment being that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the
agent of the assured.
This proposition is not without support in some of the earlier decisions on the subject; and, at a time when insurance
companies waited for parties to come to them to seek assurance, or to forward applications on their own motion, the doctrine had a reasonable foundation to rest upon. But to apply
such a doctrine, in its full force, to the system of selling policies through agents, which we have described, would be a
snare and a delusion, leading, as it has done in numerous instances, to the grossest frauds, of which the insurance corporations receive the benefits, and the parties supposing themselves insured are the victims.
The tendency of the modern decisions in this country is
steadily in the opposite direction. The powers of the agent
are primafaie, co-extensive with the business intrusted to his
care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the person with whom he deals. Beebe v. Hartford
Ins. Lb., 25 Conn. 251; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Sholenberg, 8
Wright 259; BeaZ v. Park Ins. Co., 16 Wisconsin 241; Davenport v. PeoriaIns. Co., 17 Iowa 274. An insurance com-

pany, establishing a local agency, must be held responsible to
the parties with whom they transact business for the acts and
declarations of the agent, within the scope of his employment,
as if they proceeded from the principal. Saving Bank v.
Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517; Horwitz v. -quitable Ins.
Co., 40 Missouri 557; Ayers v. Hartford Ins. Co., 17 Iowa
156; Howard Ins. Co., v. Bruner, 11 Harris 60.

In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a
full consideration of the authorities, it is said that, "by the
interested or officious zeal of the agents employed by the insurance companies in the wish to outbid each other and procure customers, they not unfrequently mislead the insured, by
a false or erroneous statement of what the application should
contain, or, taking the preparation of it into their own hands,
procure his signature by an assurance that it is properly drawn,
and will meet the requirements of the policy. The better
opinion seems to be that, when this course is pursued, the
description of the risk should, though nominally proceeding
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from the insured, be regarded as the act of the insurers."
.Rowly v. Empire Ins. Co., 36 New York 550.
The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and
they seem to us founded in reason and justice, and meet our
entire approval.
This principle does not admit oral testimony to vary or contradict that which is in writing, but it goes upon the idea that
the writing offered in evidence was not the instrument of the
party whose name is signed to it; that it was procured under
such circumstances by the other side as estops that side from
using it or relying on its contents-not that it may be contradicted by oral testimony, but that it may be shown by such
testimony that it cannot be lawfully used against the party
whose name is signed to it.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
The decisions of the Supreme Court that it is properly drawn, yet the inof the United States, on questions of surance is invalidated by reason of
insurance and commercial law have any misstatement or omission which it
always been treated with great respect was the duty of the assured, by the
and deference by the courts of the seve- terms of the contract, to set forth.
ralStates. And this not only from the That he was misled by the agent of the
ability that has generally character- insurer is held to be no answer. Inized the judicial utterances of that deed be is not permitted to show by
tribunal, but from a recognition of the parol that he was thus misled, because
necessity of establishing, in that class the policy itself is treated as the sole
of cases, a uniform rule. We, there- evidence of the contract. "A court of
fore, regard the foregoing. case as pe- law" said F/rrcazn J., n Barrel v.
culiarly interesting, as being likely Union Mut. F. Ins. Cb., 7 Cush. 175,
to settle the law upon a question that "must act on the agreement as it is; it
has hitherto divided the judicial mind, cannot strike out or change any part,
and to settle it too upon a basis of sub- or add anything to it, so as to contradict or vary the agreement contained
stantial justice.
It is not our purpose to examine in in the written insturment." Andinthe
detail the cases that relate to this hith- subsequent case of Lee v. Howard Ins.
erto vexaa qumstio, but to state in Co., 3 Gray 553, where the application
general terms theconflicting principles was signed by the assured, on the
that have been applied by the courts faith of an assurance from ihe agent
in deciding them. On the one hand who drew it up, that it was such a deit is held that, notwithstanding the scription of the premises as the proviagent of the insurer may mislead the sions of the policy required, and conassured by an erroneous statement of tained all that was necessary to render
what the application should contain, the contract valid, the court held that
or procure his signature to an applica- the insurance was invalidattd by the
tion drawn by himself on the assurance failure of the application to disclose
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the specific use for which one of the
buildings was employed. Although
being less hazardous than that actually
set forth, it would not have occasioned
anincrease of premlumif made known
and had consequently been disregarded as immaterial by the agent.
"Upon the most familiar principle
of the law of evidence," said Bxexsow,
J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, "all previous verbal agreements
must be taken to be merged in the
written agreement ofthe parties, made
for the very purpose of embodying
the terms of their contract, and designed to be the depository and proof
of their ainal intention.'
See also
Brown v. The Cataraugus Lo. 1fz.
Ins. Lb., 18 N.- T. 885; ennings v. The
Chenango Cb. Mut. Ins. Cb., 2 Denlo 75;
Vanderverst v. The Lblum
w a..
Co.,
2 Cairns 155; Holmes v. Charlestown
Nut. F. Ins. Lb., 10 Mioh. 211.
On the other hand, it is held, in accordance with the doctrine of the case
In the text, that the maxim quifacitper
aium facit per se applies with peculiar
force to the acts of insurance agents,
and when such an agent, with full
knowledge of all the facts, draws up the
application, declares it satisfactory and
induces the applicant for insurance
to slgn it, his principal Is affected with
the knowledge of the agent, and wilibe
estopped to repudiate the contract on
the ground of the latter's nnskillfulness,
carelessness or fraud. In other words,
although an application for insurance
contains a false statement as to a ma.
terial matter, the writing will never.
theless be held to express the contract
between the parties, and neither will be
permitted to insist that the contract is
other than what the writing expresses,
provided such false statement is chargeable to the agent of the company in
making the survey and filling up the
application, while acting within the
line of his duty.

27tw 0naIns. Co, v. OlmsteuAd 23lich.
246; Rowley v. 7w Empire Ins. Lb., 38
New York 285, 40 Id. 557; Combs v .Xe
Hannibal F. & M. Ins. Lb., 43 Mo. 148;
Peorid M. & . Ins. Co. v. Hall, 12
Mfich. 203; Franklin v. The Atlantic .
Ins. C., 42 Mo. 457; The People's Ins. Lb.
v. Spencer, 3F. P. Smith 353; TheHoward
SIns. b. v. Bruner,1 Harris 60; The
PerryIns. Lb. v. Stewart, 7 Id. 45; Mea.
dowcraft v. StandardF. Ins. Cb., n P. F.
Smith 91; Beal v. 2%e Park F. Ins. Lb.
-16 Wis. 241; TAe Bank v. 2Te Charter
Oak Ins. Cb., 31 Con. 517; Ptumb v. The
(CattaraugusIns. Cb., 18 New York 392;
Goodal v. The Atlantic Ins. Cb., 35 N. .
828; Ayres v. The HartfordIns. Lb., 17
Iowa176; 211d. 173; ram v. The Noational 1hs. Lb., 16 Md. 269; The Columbia
Ins. Co. v. Lbo~per, 14 Wright 331; Geib
v. Ins. Cb., I Dillon, C. C.. R. 443; see
also Eis v. The Albany 1ty .F.Ins. Lb.
4 Lansing 438.
In cases like the foregoing theinsurer,
either upon the ground of estoppel or
waiverisprevented frountaking advantage ofthefalse orerroneousstatements
of the application, and is held to the
performance of his contract.
In Peoria f. & . Ins. Lb. v. H al, it
was a condition of the policy that the
keeping of gunpowder "without written permission in the policy," should
avoid the contract, but there was evidence that the agent knew it was kept
at the time and was to be kept after
the insurance, and that he assented to
it, and induced the plaintiffto believe
that it would make no difference. The
court held fbat the company were
chargeable with the knowledge of the
agent; and receiving the premium and
issuing the policy when possessed of
such knowledge was in legal effect a
waiver of the condition.
"The counsel for the plaintiff in er.
ror," said the court, "insists that the
printed condition was notice to the
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by limitations not communicated to
the person with whom he deals." And
this is in strict accord with well settled
principles. "When a person is employed in a particular department of
business," said NElsox, C. J.,In Sanford
v. Randy 23 Wend. 260-266, "and is employed to doan act within his line, with
s pecialrestricdions,then the general powers derivable from thenature ofhis ordinary employment will controlthe limitation; he willbeheld topossess such In
the particular instance as his ordinary
occupation fairly imports to the public." See also Drmd rfv. Beardsley,
23 Barb. 656-660; Ellis v. The Albany
My . Ins. Co. 4 Lansing 433.
But when the agent, by tileexpress
condition of the policy, is made the
agent of the insured, and it is also a
condition of the policy that the application shall be a warranty on the part
of the insured, and the application
contains a misstatement, this is a
breach of the warranty; and it is held
that it is no defense that the agent
knew the real facts. By express contract he is made the agent of the insured, and hence it was his agent and
And theposition of the insurer is not not the agent of the insurer who knew
changed by reason of undisclosed in. the truth of the matter. Abbott v.
structions to the agent to consider Sbhawmnt .Mut. F. Ins. Cb., 3 Allen 213;
himself in taking and forwarding ap- 2lreyv. same,4 Id. 116. See also 5hawplications as the agent of the appli- mat Mat. F. Ins. Co.v. trevens, 9 Allen
cant. Beebe v. Yhe Hartford Lb. Mut. 32 On the otherhand,in Cblumbians.
. Ins. Lo. 25 Conn. 51;
nor by Co. v. Cooper, 14 Wright 831, where it
a provision In his by-laws that the was an express stipulation of the conagent in performing these duties shall tract that any violation of the condibe deemed the agent of the applicant. tions upon which the insurance was
.Masters v. Mfadison Cb. Mut. Ins C., effected should be construed as the
11 Barb. 624. The tendency of the act of the insured, and should render
recent decisions is to hold the insurer the policy void, it was held that such
bound by the acts of local agents when- stipulation was not binding on the asever itcan be done consistently with sured. The applicant, in that case
the evidence and rules of law. 1'The had informed theagentthat thcre were
powers of the agent," in the language judgments against his property, but
of fr. Justce1rLLE, "areprit'i ,,cie, that he dildnot know whether they
co-extensive with the business r rusttwould bind the property proposed to
ed to his care, and will notbe a," .V(odbe insured. Tile agent thought they

assured of the agent's want of authority to assent to the keeping of gunpowder, etc., and that this assent could be
given only by the company itself. This,
at first view, would seem plausible,
and might be sound, but for another
principle which lies back of it and defeats its application. The principle to
which we allude is, that notice to the
agent is notice to his principal. The
company must be regarded as knowing
what he knew. If he knew that powder was kept at the time of the insurance, or to be kept during its continuance, the company must be regarded as
having known it also. They had power
to waive the condition, and by taking
the premium and issuing the policy
with such notice or knowledge, they
must be regarded as having waived the
conditton.which prohibited its keeping
It would be a gross fraud in the company to waive the premum forissuing
a policy on which they did not Intend
to be liable, and which they intended
to treat as void in case of loss." See to
the same effect People's Ins. Cb., v.
Spencer, 3 P. F. Smith 58
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would not, and wrote down the answer
accordingly. The policy, however, did
not contain any express covenant of
the assured, as in the preceding cases,
that made his answers a warranty. He
' as bound to answer in good faith,"
said WOODWARD, C. J., "and he did so.
But notwithstanding the above recited
condition he was not responsible for
the blunders of the agent. If the agent
returned that there were no incumbrances, when he had been informed
there were judgments and a lease, he
may have violated the 'conditions.'
But no company has a right to select

and send out agents to solicit patron.
age and business for its benefit, and
then to saddle their blunders upon its
customers. If the assured combine
with the agent to cheat the company,
we protect the company (Smith v. Tns.
Co.,12 Harris 320); but if the assured
has covenanted for nothing, and has
been guilty of no misrepresentation,
concealment or fraud, the company
bad better pay his lossthan to attempt
to make him responsible for the blunders of their own agent."
HEaNY FLANDERS.
.Phila., Xuly, 1872

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
HILL V. SPEAR.
The validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where itwas
made, unless it was agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that it sbould be performed elsewhere; in which case the general rule is, that the contract, as to its
validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of
the place of performance.
Contracts, valid by the law of the place where they are matte, are generally
valid everywhere, Jure gentum, and by tacit consent. And If, in the place where
the contract is made, the policy of the local law would enforce it, it will also be
enforced in the jurisdiction to which a party maybe compelled to resort for the
application of a remedy for the violation of such contract.
An exception to this rule, however, consists in this: that no nation or State is
bound to recognize or enforce any contracts which are injurious to its own interests or the welfare of its own people, or which are in fraud and violation of
its own laws.
A man is presumed to know and understand not only the laws of the country
wherein he dwells, but also those of the foreign country or State in which he
transacts business.
The validity of a vendor's claim to recover the price of goods sold with knowledgethat the purchaser intends to make an unlawful use of them, depends upon
the circumstance whether or not the original vendor participated actively, to a
greater or less extent, in the subsequent unlawful disposition of the goods; or,
'whether the expectation of advantage and profit to him, growing out of the unlawful disposition of the goods by the purchaser, entered into and constituted a
part of the inducement and consideration ofthe original sale.
If such expectation of advantage to the vendor was an ingredient in the consideration for the original sale, or if the original vendor participated in the subsequent unlawful disposition of the goods, he cannot recover the price of them
in our courts.
Mere belief on the part of the seller of goods that the purchaser buys for the
purpose of carrying them into another State, to be there re-sold in violation of
law, does not invalidate the sale.
The mere solicitation, by a dealer in liquors, of orders in the future for such
goods, even though the person soliciting such orders may thave had reason to
believe, and did believe, that if such liquors should be ordered and purchased
they would be re-sold by the purchaser in violation of law, is not such a circumVor. XX.-32.
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stance as will affect the validity ofa subsequent sale of such goods in a State
where such sale is not prohibited by law.
E. kept a saloon in iMl.,in this State, where he was accustomed to retail spirituous liquors contrary to law. S. was a dealer in spirituous liquors in the State
of New York, where such traffic was not prohibited. S. had visited E.'s saloon
in I., and on one occasion had solicited orders from E. for liquors. Subsequently
S. sold to E. a quantity of spirituous liquors. The contract of sale was made
and completed, and the goods were delivered in New York. S. had no interest
nor concern in the disposition of the liquors by B., and did no act beyond the
sale to E. in furtherance of B.'s purpose to sell the liquors in this State; but
there was evidence tending to show that S., when he solicited orders from E.
and sold him the liquors, had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that
E. intended to re-sell those liquors at his saloon in this State ;-held, thatthe
contract of sale, being valid by the laws of New York, should be enforced here.

TROVER, by Joseph G. Hill against Justin Spear, a deputy sheriff, for attaching property on a writ in favor of William Stewart
against Dudley B. Emerson. The taking was admitted. The
plaintiff's claim to a portion of the property was founded on an alleged purchase from Emerson, the validity of which was disputed
by the defendant.
The other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff requested the following instructions: 1. That if
the liquors were sold with knowledge that they were purchased
with a view and intention of a re-sale in this State contrary to our
laws, and the liquors were so sold, they would constitute no indebtedness so as to entitle Stewart to impeach the sale as being
fiaudulent.
2. If the jury believe that Stewart came into this State and solicited Emerson to purchase liquors of him, knowing that if purchased they were to be sold in his saloon contrary to the laws of
this State, that no liquors thus sold could constitute an indebtedness to entitle the defendant to attach on the ground of the sale
being invalid as against creditors.
3. If the jury find that Stewart encouraged Emerson to purchase the liquors and sell them in violation of the laws of the
State, any liquors thus sold could not make him a creditor in this
State.
The instructions asked for were not given, and the plaintiff excepted.
The jury found the plaintiff entitled to recover for a portion of
the articles described in his writ, but not for any of the articles
which he claimed by purchase from Emerson. (The verdict was
in the form agreed on by the parties, to be used in the event of
the jury's coming to such a conclusion.)
The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict by reason of the
foregoing exceptions.
4 FOSTER, J -The main question in this case is, whether Stewart, represented here by the defendant, an attaching officer, holding the property Of Emerson by virtue of Stewart's attachment,
can, as against the plaintiff, claiming title to the same by purchase from Emerson, hold the property thus attached; the object
of Stewart's suit and attachment being to recover the price of
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spirituous liquors sold by him to Emerson, and by Emerson resold in violation of our laws -or, in fewer words, whether under
the circumstances of this case, the court will lend its aid toward
the enforcement of Stewart's claim to recover the price of the
spirituous liquors thus sold by him.
In order to make a correct application of the principles and
rules of law which are to determine this question, it will be
necessary to examine with care the peculiar facts of the case.
Stewart was a dealer in spirituous liquors, residing and doing
business in the city of New York: Emerson was a retailer of
spirituous liquors at his saloon in Manchester. This establishment, in the hands of Emerson and his predecessors in the same
business, was well known to Stewart, who had frequently visited
the saloon, and of whom Emerson and the preceding proprietors
of the saloon had previously bought liquois which were retailed
by therh to their customers.
There was evidence from which the jury might have found
that, on at least one occasion when Stewart was at the saloon, he
virtually solicited orders from Emerson for liquors; and there was
evidence tending to show that when he solicited such orders, and,
subsequently, sold liquors to Emerson, Stewart had reasonable
cause to believe, and did believe, that Emerson intended to re-sell
them at his saloon in Manchester. Not long after one of these
visits, on which occasion he had solicited such orders, Emerson
ordered liquo.'s of Stewart by letter (not, however, in pursuance
of any previous contract or understanding); and the liquors so ordered were delivered by Stewart to a carrier in New York, directed to Emerson at Manchester, N. H., and were duly received
by Emerson.
It does not appear, as matter of fact, that Stewart, when he
solicited the orders or sold the liquor, was acquainted with the
laws of this state regulating the sale of spirituous liquors; and
the court refused to permit the plaintiff to inquire of Stewart
whether he did not understand that the sale of liquor in New
Hampshire was prohibited except by town agents.
The ruling of the court in this particular was correct. Ignorance of the law would have furnished no excuse to Stewatt.
Broom's Leg. Maxims, 190. Every man is presumed to know the
laws of the country in which he dwells, or in which, if residing
abroad, he transacts business. A. foreigner, trading in or to this
country, is bound to take notice of our laws; and a contract made
by him in violation of them will not be enfdrced in our courts.
faffit, 2 Wash. C. C. 98; 1 Bishop on Criminal
Cambiosoco v.
Law, § 375.
The plaintiff contends that Stewart, by coming into this State
and here soliciting orders for liquors, knowing that, if purchased,
they were to be sold by the purchaser in violation of our law,
committed an indictable offense; that he was an aider or accessory to the offense of selling the liquors by Emerson; that the
contract of sale, upon which Stewart 61aims as a creditor of Emer-
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son, grows out of and is connected with an immoral and an illegal
act, and is, therefore, not to be protected or enforced by our courts;
and that Stewart, therefore, is not, as a creditor of Emerson, entitled to impeach the validity of the alleged sale by Emerson to
the plaintiff.
It is an elementary principle that no contract can be enforced,
nor any damages recovered, for the breach of a contract or promise
which contravenes the principles of the common law, the provisions of a statute, or the general policy of the 4aw. Ketcalf on Contracts 221.
And it is well settled in this State, that the consideration agreed
to be paid for spirituous liquors sold without license, cannot be recovered. The sale being prohibited by statute, and the vendor
being liable to a criminal prosecution for the selling, the traffic is
made illegal, and contracts respecting it cannot be enforced.
Wherever an indictment can be sustained for the illegal sale, there
the price cannot be recovered. Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. HI. 384,
and cases cited; Plumer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 553; Met. on Contracts 225.
The reasons which lie at the foundation of these well-established
principles are suggested by considerations of sound public policy.
The public good and not the defendant's advantage is the controlling consideration. Beach v. Kezar, I N. H. 185. For I apprehend the moral instincts of courts and juries would naturally
revolt against the encouragement of a defense so mean, impudent
and contemptible.
"The objection," says Lord MANSFIELD, in Holman v. Johnson,
Cowper 348, "that a contract is immoral or illegal as between
plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth
of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded on general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the
real justice as between him and the plaintiff; not for the sake of
the defendant, but because the court will 'not lend their aid to such
a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides,
and the defendant were to bring his action against the plaintiff,
the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both
are equally in fault, potior est conditio d fendentis." The law in
such cases'leaves the parties where it finds them. Chitty on Contracts 731 ; Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286; Boby v. West, 4 N. H.
285.
But, generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where it was made, unless it was
agreed, either expressly or by tacit implication, that it should be
performed in some other place; and then the general rule is, that
the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the place of performance.
Story on Conf. of Laws, §§ 242, 280 ; U. S. Bank v. Domnally, 8
Pet. 372; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. 379 ; Andrews v. Pond, 13
Pet. 65 ; Don v. Lippman, 5 Cl. and F. 13 ; Bergusson v. Fyffe,
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8 Cl. and F. 121. Contracts, valid by the law of the place where
they are made, are generally valid everywhere, jure gentium, and
by tacit consent. 2 Kent's Com. (ed. 1866) 454
And if, in the place where the contract was made, the policy of
the local law would enforce it, it will also be enforced in the jurisdiction to which a party may be compelled to resort for the application of his remedy for a breach of the foreign contract.
This rule, it has been said, is founded not merely in the convenience, but in the necessities of nations and States: for, otherwise, it would be impracti6able for them to carry on an extensive
intercourse and commerce with each other.
"Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est; nam
usu exigente, et humanis necessitatibus." 1 Inst. Lib. 1, tit. 2, §2.
Upon the foundation of this doctrine rests the whole system of
sales, agencies, credits, and negotiable instruments; "and," says
Judge STORY, "no more forcible applicati6n can be propounded of
this imperial doctrine, than to the subject of international private
contracts." Story's Conf. Laws, § 242.
With peculiar cogency does the doctrine apply to the positive
necessities of a country like ours, composed of thirty-seven distinct sovereignties, in strictness wholly independent of each others'
local laws, but most essentially dependent for their general prosperity upon the deference, respect and regard for each others'
peculiar policy which the comity of nations demands.
But there is an important exception to the rule, consisting hi
this: that no nation or State is bound to recognize or enforce contracts which the government of such State or nation may deem
injurious to its own interests or the welfare of its own people, or
which are in fraud and violation of its own laws. Such contracts
are considered as nullities in every country affected by such considerations, although they may be valid by the laws of the place
where they are made. Story's Conflict of Laws, § 244; Andrews
v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.
The exception is important, notwithstanding the imperative
necessity which lies at the foundation of the rule; for, while the
comity of nations and States will always regard with respect and
consideration the laws and customs of other communities, still its
-own interests and the welfare of its own citizens will nevertheless be held by every State in paramount consideration. One of
the most difficult questions, therefore, with which the courts of
the various States composing the Federal Union have to deal, is
precisely that now presented: namely, To what extent will the
courts go in sustaining an exception that takes out of the general
rule and invalidates a contract sought to be enforced here, which,
though entirely legal in the jurisdiction where the contract Was
made, is regarded, in this State, as contrary to morality or the
provisions of our local statute?
Viewed in the light of all these suggestions, the principal question presented is, whether the evidence which shows that Stewart
knew or had reasonable cause to believe that Emerson, at the time
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of the sale to him, intended to transport the liquors into this State,
to be here kept and sold in violation of'our laws, would constitute a
defense, if the present suit were brought by the vendor against
the vendee to recover the price of the liquors.
In considering this matter, we are not for a moment to lose
sight of, nor to underrate the importance, the imperative necessity
for the enforcement of the rule; and we are to admit no given
case within the exception, unless by the compulsion of a necessity
demanded by local policy or positive law.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that the present case falls within
the exception..
The case of Smith v. Godfrey, before cited, must be regarded
as decisive to a certain extent of the questions involved in this
inquiry; and as fully sustaining the ruling of the judge at the
trial term, in refusing to give the first branch of the instructions
desired by the plaintiff. It is there held that "bare knowledge
on the part of the vendor of goods that they are to be sold iii
anoter State contrary to the laws of that State, will not make the
sale of the same illegal in the State where the sale is not prohibited." It is also there held that the price of goods sold and delivered in a State where such sale is legal, and where nothing remains
to be done by the vendor to complete the transaction, and he is
not in any way to be further connected with it, may be recovered
in this State, where such sale would be illegal. "Aliter, if it be
an ingredientin the contract that the goods shall be illegally sold,
or that the seller shall do any act to assist or facilitate the illegal
sale."
In the present case, it is conceded that the sale by Stewart to
Emerson was consummated in New York, that the goods were
there delivered to Emerson's agent, and that the sale was not in
violation of the laws of that State.
The only remaining question then is, whether this case is
brought within the exception alluded to, because of the mixture
of any ingredient in the original contract of sale providing that
the goods should be illegally sold by Emerson, or by any act of
Stewart, aiding, assisting, or facilitating the illegal sale in this
State. But there is no evidence that the contract of sale between
Stewart and Emerson was complicated by any "ingredient" concerning the subsequent disposition of the liquors by Emerson;
and the "act" of assistance or facilitation of a subsequent illegal
sale by Emerson was neither more nor less than this: "On at
least one occasion when Stewart was at the saloon, he virtually
solicited orders from Emerson for liquors," believing, at the time,
that Emerson intended to re-sell them at his saloon in New
Hampshire.
It does not appear, nor is it suggested, that Stewart advised,
requested, or encouraged the sale of the liquors by Emerson contrary to law, in any other way than by soliciting him to purchase
them; nor that he had any participation in the re-sale otherwise
than by furnishing the liquors to Emerson for a price which does
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not appear to have been regulated by any consideration relative to
the final disposition of the property by Emerson. Stewart's connection with the transaction terminated with his delivery of the
goods to the carrier, an agent of Emerson, in New York. It
does not even appear that Stewart bad any actual knowledge of
Emerson's purpose or intentions with regard to the disposition of
the liquors.
The authorities bearing more or less directly upon the subject
before us, are quite numerous and somewhat conflicting.
Judge METCALF, in his work on Contracts, pp. 260, 261, uses
the following language: "As 'courts will not lend their aid to
enforce a contract entered into with a view of carrying into effect
anything which is prohibited by law,' they will not allow a party
who sells goods, knowing that the buyer is to use them in contra
vention of a statute, to recover the price. Thus, where an Englishman in Guernsey sold goods and assisted in packing them in a
particularmanner for the purpose of their being smuggled into
England, it was held that the seller could not recover pay for
them. Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454. And the same doctrine
was applied where the seller was a foreigner, who sued on a bill
of exchange given for goods which he had assistedin smuggling
into England. He could not resort to the laws of England, which
he had assisted to evade. Clugas v. Penalula,4 T. R. 466;
Wymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599. Where an English merchant
chartered a vessel of a merchant in New York, while the nonintercourse laws of the United States were in force, for the purpose of conveying a cargo from New York to Fayal, to be transported thence to England, it was held that he could not maintain
an action in this country for the hire of the vessel. Graves v.
Delaplaine, 14 Johns. 146."
The learned author then cites, with apparent disapproval, the
antecedent ca.e of Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, where the
contract and delivery of goods were complete abroad, and the
vendor, a foreigner, did not act to assist the smuggling of them;
and he was held entitled to recover pay for them in England,
though he knew that they were to be smuggled. "This case,"
he says, "can be reconciled with the subsequent decisions only on
the ground that a foreigner is not bound to guard the revenue
laws of England, though he cannot actively assist in violating
them." And he continues as follows: "Though MANsFiELD, 0.
J., in Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181, said, 'the merely selling
goods, knowing that the buyer will make an'illegal use of them,
is not sufficient to deprive the vendor of the price, etc.; he should
share in the illegal transaction;' yet that point was not necessarily involved in the decision; and in Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos.
& Pul. 551, it was decided that a person selling goods in order
that they might be exported to 'a place where, by statute, they
could not be exported legally, could not recover, even on a bond
given for the price of them." He also cites in support of his
position Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593; and Cannanv. Bryce,
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3 B. & Ald. 179, in which ABBOTT, C. J., is reported as inquiring-"if it be unlawful for any man to pay [for settling losses on
illegal stock-jobbing transactions], how can it he lawful t:or another
to furnish him with the means of paymnent ?"--and various other
cases which, he thinks, tend to the same result. He concludes
that Lord ERSKINE, in Ex-parleBulmer, 13 Yes. 353, is at variance
with the King's Bench, in Ex-parte Bell, 1 M. & S. 751, and that
Lord ERSKINE's doctrine is not recognized as the law of England.
It is manifest that if Judge METCALF'S deductions from the
cases cited by him are correct and sustain the view which he
adopts, those cases are not in accordance with the view of the
law entertained by this court in Smith v. God~fre,.
We shall
advert to some of these cases again presently.
And it is manifest that Judge -AETU.L1 makes no distinction I(tween a case of bare knowledge of illegal intent on the part of the
vendee, and an active participation and assistance in the perfoirmance
of the illegal intent:-between the act of putting- into the party's
possession the means of doing an unlawful act with the belief
that such unlawful act will be done, and the furtherance of that
unlawful act by actively aiding its accomplishment.
In Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110, the plaintiff, residing in
New York, and being authorized to sell spirituous liquors there,
sold some there to the defendant, who resided in Vermont, where
the sale of such liquors was unlawful, the plaintiff, at the time of
the sale, knowing that the defendant intended to sell them in
Vermont contrary to law. The liquors were delivered in New
York to a carrier designated by the defendant, to be transportedi
to Vermont at the risk of the latter. But, at the defendant's request, and to prevent the seizure of the liquors in Vermont, the
plaintiff marked the casks in a peculiar way, omitting the defeudant's name.
In delivering the opinion of the court, ALDIS, J., said: "Although mere knowledge of the unlawful intent of The vendee by
the vendor will not bar him from enforcing his contract to recover
for the goods in our courts, yet it is well settled that if he in any
way aid the vendee in his unlawful design to violate our laws, such
participation in the illegal enterprise will disqualify him from
maintaining an action on his contract in this State. . The participation by the vendor must be active to some extent; he must do
something, though indirectly, in furtherance of the vendee's design to violate our laws, Mere omission to act is not enough, but
positive acts in aid of the unlawful purpose, however slight, are
sufficient.
"The omission to mark the casks with the defendant's name,
standing alone, would not in our judgment be an act of participation sufficient to bar the plaintiff. But the plaintiff went further;
and the act done, though slight, is significant. He so marked
them that the defendant might instantly'know his casks on their
arrival, and so be enabled to remove them before the officers of the
State should have their suspicions awakened. This act, though so
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slight, gave the defendant an advantage over the officers, and
aided him in escaping their vigilance. This was the object the
plaintiff and the defendant intended to accomplish by having them
so marked. We think the act done tended to secure their design.
As the evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff, by his acts done
in connection with the sale and delivery of the liquors, aided the
defendant to escape the vigilance of the officers, .and so to have
and sell the liquors in violation of law, it should have been admitted."
The decision of this case, then, is put clearly upon the ground
of an active participation by the plaintiff in the unlawful act of
the vendee-passive knowledge of intention being regarded as
wholly insufficient to affect the validity of the contract. Notwithstanding full knowledge of the unlawful intent of the vendee,
there must be something else actively done by him. "Mere omission to act is not enough."
In Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 656, the evidence tended to show
that, at the time of the sale of the liquors, the plaintiff was informed by the defendant of the existence of the prohibitory law
of Vermont; and that the defendant was purchasing the liquor
for the purpose of selling it in violation of the law; and that he
could not have the liquor come all at once to him, or have it directed to him openly, without risk of seizure; and that the
plaintiff agreed to send the liquor to him in a disguised form, so
as to avoid seizure; and, in pursuance of said agreenlent, he did
so send it.
I The court, PIERPOINT, .0. J., expressly affirms the'doctrine of
Gaylord v. Soragen, that mere knowledge of the defendant's unlawful intent will not bar the plaintiff's right of action, but some
active participation in the fraud will be required; and the decision
of the case against the claim of the plaintiff is placed upon the
ground that such act of the plaintiff is a positive participation in
the defendant's. guilt, and that it avoids the previous contract of
sale; because it is not a separate transaction disconnected from the
original contract, but immediately and directly connected with it,
beingeont in the act of carrying out and executing the contract,
by forWarding and delivering the property as required by the contract.
In this connection see Story on Contracts, § 625, and Territt v.
Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184.
In M'Intyre v. Parks, 3 Met. 207, it was held that a sale made
in another State and valid by the law of that State, will not be
held void in Massachusetts, from the bare fact of the knowledge
or belief of the vendor, of the purchaser's intent to re-sell in Massachusetts in violation of law.
In commenting upon this case, THoMAs, J., in Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray 587, expresses his disapprobation of the rule as there
laid down: "In my judgment," he says, "it was not rightly decided ;" and he claims that if the rule be correct it should not be
extended. "The case at bar," he says (Webster v. Munger,much
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relied upon by the plaintiff here), "does not fall within the rule.
The distinction is sound between a case where a seller simply has
knowledge of the illegal design-no more-and where, having
such knowledge, he makes a sale with a view to such design, and
for the purpose of enabling the purchaser to effect it." "In the
case before us," he continues, "the plaintiff was a citizen of and
residing in this commonwealth. The evidence shows his knowledge of the illegal business in which the defendant was engaged.
One of the orders was taken by the plaintiff at the domicil of the
defendant in this State. In one of the written orders, the illegal
purpose for which the liquor was wanted, and the time when it
would be wanted for that purpose, were indicated, and the plaintiff was urged not to fail in forwardingit, for that end. It was
on this posture of the evidence that the jury was instructed : ' 1st.
That if the contract of sale was made in Hartford, where it was a
legal transaction, the plaintiff could recover, unless for the reasons
stated in the further instruction of the court, which were,-2dly.
That if the sales were made in Hartford, by the plaintiff to the defendant, with a knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the
liquors were to be re-sold in this cornmanwealth contrary to law,
or if, when the plaintiff sold the liquors, he had reasonable cause
to believe that they were to be re-sold by the defendant contrary
to the laws of this commonwealth, and the sales were made by the
plaintiff with a view to such re-sale, then, or in either of these cases,
the plaintiff cannot maintain this action.' Under these instructions
to have found a verdict for the defendant, the jury must have been
satisfied, not merely that the plaintiff had knowledge of the illegal
purpose of the defendant, but that he sold with reference to it, and
for the purpose of enabling him to effect it. In this view, the instructions are thoroughly sound in principle, and do not conflict
with the cases decided." I am unable to regard this case as an
authority in support of the position for which it is cited; but it
seems to me of no little importance in its tendency toward the
opposite direction.
In Finch v. Mansfield, 97 Mrass. 89, the order for the liquors,
the price of which was the consideration of the promissory notes
in suit, was solicited from the defendant, at his place of residence,
by the plaintiffs' agent, who was a citizen of Connecticut, as were
also his principals. The order was transmitted by the agent to
the plaintiffs in Connecticut, who filled it there, and forwarded the
goods to the defendant in Massachusetts, who paid the freight in
pursuance of his understanding with the agent. The price of the
goods was agreed upon between the agent and the defendant at
the time of the order. On a previous occasion the agent had, in
like manner, solicited from the defendant and forwarded to the
plaintiffs a like order, which was, in like manner, filled by them,
and was paid by the defendant to the agent. It was held that the
judge rightly refused to rule, on these facts, that the sale was made
in Mlassachusetts, and submitted to the jury to determine the place
of sale, with instructions that if the agent merely solicited from the
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defendant the order and forwarded it to the plaintiffs in Connecticut, who thereupon filled it and delivered the goods to a common
carrier, directed to the defendant in Massachusetts, the sale was
made in Connecticut.
The peculiar law of Massachusetts applicable to the case, was
not alluded to by counsel or the court; but it manifestly controlled the decision in this, as in the preceding case of Webster v. manger.
The General Statutes of Massachusetts, ch. 86, § 1, provide that
"no action of any kind shall be had or maintained in any court,
for the price of any liquor sold in any other State for the purpose
of being brought into this commonwealth, to be here kept or sold
in violation of law, under such circumstancesthat the vendorwould
have reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser entertained
such illegalpurpose." It was undoubtedlyin view of this statute,
and not of any independent principle of the common law, that
HoAR,J., used this language: "The plaintiffs, who were traders
in Connecticut, might lawfully sell the liquors there, unless they
knew that they were intended to be used in violation of the laws
of Massachusetts.
But finally, this provision of the General Statutes in Massachusetts was repealed; and thereupon the courts proceeded to expound-again the doctrines of the common law upon this subject;
and CoLT, J., delivering the opinion of the court in Adams v. oulliard,102 Mass. 167, said, "The verdict of the jury, in this case,
establishes the facts that the liquors, the price of which the plaintiff seeks to recover, were sold to the defendant in -New York; and
that the plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe, bat had no knowledge that they were to be brought into this State for the purpose
of being sold here in violation of law.
"The action was commenced May 25, 1868. Under the Gen.
Stats., ch. 86, § 61, it could not have been maintained. The statute. affects the remedy, and was repealed by the Stat. of 1868, eh.
141, before this suit was commenced. The cause of action still remained, and it arose out of a contract valid by the laws of the
.place where it was made. It is claimed, on the part of the defendant,,that the contract originated in the purpose to violate a
known law of this State; and that our courts will not lend their
aid, and afford the remedy thereon, even after the repeal of such
law. To do this, it is said, would violate an elementary principle
of the common law. The illegality of the contract must be determined by the law as it existed at the time the contract was entered into. If then illegal at the place where the contract is sought
to be enforced, the rule applies.
"It is not necessary, here, to consider whether the general rule
has any modifications, when applied to contracts made out of the
State, or to contracts made solely with reference to a violation of
the revenue laws. In order to make the plaintiff, under any circumstances, a participant in such unlawful sale, at common law, it
is necessary that he should, at least, have knowledge of the un-
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lawful purpose. In some early cases it was held that mere knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the buyer, on the part of the seller,
without further act, where the illegal use to be made of the goods
was no inducement in the mind of the seller, would not vitiate the
sale so as to deprive the seller of his remedy. Clearly it is not
enough, if he has only reasonable cause to believe that a violation
of law is intended. The statute alone introduces this element,
and upon its repeal the rule at common law only applies."
With much deference, I am constrained to say that the distinction suggested in the foregoing remarks between mere knowledge
and mere reasonable cause of belief, seems to me thin and
shadowy.
However this may be, the case of Adams v. Coulliard is precisely the case we are now considering, and is an express authority to the point that, at common law, and independent of statutory
provisions, reasonable cause of belief on the part of the seller of
goods that the purchaser buys for the purpose of carrying them
into another State to be there re-sold in violation of law, does not
invalidate the sale.
I propose now to revert to the cases already spoken of which
are collected and commented upon by Judge METCALF in his work
on Contracts 260, 261. The leading case in England is that of
Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, where the plaintiff, residing at
Dunkirk, had sold the defendant a quantity of tea, knowing that
the latter intended to smuggle it into England, but had himself no
concern in the smuggling, and merely sold the tea to the defendant as he would have sold to any other person, in the ordinary
course of trade. The action was brought for the price of the tea;
and it was held that the plaintiff could recover. Lord MANSFiELD,
in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following language:
"Is there any law of England transgressed by a person making a
complete sale of a parcel of goods at Dunkirk and giving credit for
them ? The contract is complete, and nothing is left to be done.
The seller indeed knows what the buyer is going to do with the
go.)ds, but has no concern in the transaction itself. It is not a
bargain to be paid in case the vendee should succeed in landing
th goods, but the interest of the vendor is totally at an end, and
his contract complete, by the delivery of the goods at Dunkirk."
The reasoning of this case rests entirely upon the fact that the
contract of sale had no reference to or connection with the subsequent disposition of the goods; that mere knowledge of the unlawful intent does not make the vendor a participator in the guilt
of the purchaser.
Such also is the principle recognized in Faikney v. Reynous, 4

Burr. 2069.

Lord

MNANSFIELD,

who delivered the opinion in this

case also, says: "The seller indeed knows what the buyer is going to do with the goods, but the interest of the vendor is totally
at an end, and his contract complete by the delivery of the goods."
Biqrqs v. Lawrence, 3 Term R. 454; Clugas v. Penaluna, 4
Te:m R. 466; and Waymell v. Reed, 5 Term R. 599, were all
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cases in which the plaintiff sold the goods with knowledge that
the purchaser intended to smuggle them; and in each case the
plaintiff was- nonsuited ;-but they all differed from Hfolman v.
Johnson in this, that in each of these cases, in addition to knowledge of the purchaser's criminal intent, the plaintiff did some act
in aid of and to facilitate the smuggling of the goods. Such additional act, in direct furtherance of the purchaser's guilty design,
was held to make the plaintiff particepscriminis.
In Waymell v. Reed, BULLER, J., says: "In Holman v. Johnson
the seller did not assist the buyer in the smuggling. He merely
sold the goods in the common and ordinary course of trade; but
this case does not rest merely on the circumstance of the plaintiff's
knowledge of the use intended to be made of the goods; for he actually assisted the defendants in the act of smuggling, by packing
the goods up in a manner most convenient for that purpose,"
In Pellecatv. Angell, 2 Crompt. Mees. & Ros. 311, the court
held that the plaintiff could recover the price of the goods, notwithstanding his knowledge, at the time of the sale, that the goods
were intended to be smuggled into England ;-Lord ABINGER said:.
" The distinction is, where he takes an actual part in illegal adventure; as, in packing the goods in prohibited parcels or otherwise, there he must take the consequences of his own act." Again,
he says: "The plaintiff sold the goods; the defendant might smuggle them if he liked, or he might change his mind the next day:
it does not at all import a contract of which the smugglingwas an
essentialpart."
In the same case, ALDERsoN, B., says: "If the plea disclosed
circumstances from which it followed that permitting the plaintiff
to recover would be permitting him to receive the fruits of an illegal act, the argument for the defendant would be right; but that
ground fails, because the mere sale to a party, although he may
intend to commit an illegal act, is no breach of the law."
In Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181, the plaintiffs were distillers, and sold the liquors to the defendants with full knowledge of t] eir intention to retail them contrary to law. In an action to recover the price of the liquors, the defendants insisted that
the plaintiff's recovery was barred because they were participes
criminis. - But MANSFIELD, C. J., said: "This would be carrying the law much further than it has ever yet been carried. The
merely selling goods, knowing that the buyer will make an illegal
not sufficient to deprive the vendor of his just right
use of them, -is
of payment; but to effect that, it is necessary that the vendor
should be a sharer in the illegal transaction."
The case of Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & Pul. 551, is relied
upon by counsel for the plaintiff, here, as being diametrically opposed to the doctrine of these other English cases, and also to that
of Cannan v. Bryce, 3 Barn. & Ald.179 ; MKinnell v. Robinson,
3 Mees. & Wels. 434; Peck v. Briggs, 3 Denio 107; and Whitev.
Buss, 3 Gush. 448, and as sustaining the position that mere knowledge of the purchaser's intention to make an unlawful use of the
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goods is suficiecnt to make the vendor of such goods particeps
criminis with the purchaser.
But SELrE-N, J., in Tracy v. Talmage, 4 N. Y. 173, contends
that when the precise ground upon which these cases were decided is considered, they will be found not in conflict with Faikney
v. 1eynous and Holman v. Johnson, but to support rather than to
detract from the doctrine advanced in these cases. "That ground,"
he says, "is this: that it was the express object of the plaintiffs
in these cases (Tenant v. Lightfoot, and others of that class), in
selling the goods or lending the money, that they should be used
for an unlawful purpose, and that such purpose entered into and
formed a part of the contract of sale or loan."
A reference to Lightfoot v. Tenant confirms this view very
clearly. The action was upon a bond given for goods sold. The
defendant pleaded that the plaintiff sold the goods "in order that"
they should be shipped without license, in violation of law. The
issue being found for the defendant, upon a motion for judgment
non obstante, EYRE, 0. J., contended that "the jury havingfound
that the plaintiff having sold the goods 'in order that' they should
he shipped, etc., it cannot be said that he had no interest in their
future destination; that he may be supposed to have sold the
goods for an enhanced price, relying upon the profits to be realized
from the illicit trade, for payment." See his extended remarks, 1
Bos. and Pul. 555, 556. And he says again (p. 557), "The jury
having found for the plea, the court cannot say that the plaintiff
had nothing to do with the future destination of the goods, unless
it was impossible to state a case in which they could have anything to do with it."
A critical examination of this case must lead, we think, to the
conclusion that it is decided upon the consideration that some advantage to the vendor from the future illegal use of the goods
was an essential ingredient in the original contract of sale.
And with reference to Lightfoot v. Tenant, Cannan v. Bryce,
M'Kinnel v. Robinson, -Peck v. Briggs, White v. Buss, and a
few others of kindred character, C003STOOK, J., in his opinion, delivered after a re-argument of Tracy v. Talmage, says: "I group
these cases together because they do not differ essentially in principle. Some of them sustain the position that if the vendor of
goods or the lender of money can be connected in intention with
the illegal purpose to which the goods or money is to be applied,
it is enough to defeat this action, although the unlawful use is not
specified in the contract, and although he does no act in furtherance of the design beyond the sale or loan. But further than this
they do not go.
"1There is certainly room for a distinction between a case where
the seller or lender simply knows of the illegal design, and one
where he advances the money or the goods for the express purpose of enabling the other party to effectuate such design. For
illustration: money may be lent in a gambling house, for the
specific purpose of staking it on the result of a game: the law
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says it cannot be recovered. But suppose a broker or a banker
lends money in his office, in the regular course of his business,
knowing his .customer to be a gambler by habit, and believing
that he wants the loan for gaming purposes: if the illegal design
does not enter at all into the negotiation of the contract, if it forms
no part of the inducement to the transaction, will the knowledge
or belief of the lender (and knowledge and belief, for the purposes
of this question, are the same) prevent him from recovering the
money when it is due? Such a doctrine, I apprehend, would be
highly inconvenient in a commercial community. It would exact
a more frequent scrutiny, on the part of dealers, into the habits
and designs of others than the law requires any man to make."'
And so it was held, in McGavock v. Puryear,6 Coldw. (Tenn.)
34, that the mere knowledge, on'the part of the lender of money,
that the borrower intends making an illegal use of the money, is
not sufficient to fix the stain of illegality upon the transaction.
To do this it must appear that the lender made the loan, on his
part, to produce the doing of the illegal act.
Beach v. Kezar, belongs to the same class of cases. It was
assumpsit -for keeping oxen for the defendant at Canaan in the
year 1813 ;-one ground of defense was that the cattle belonged
to one Bailey, who, from the commencement of the war till the
time of the purchase, had resided in Canada, and had been employed in. procuring beef for the enemy's troops; that he had
made Canaan a rendezvous for the cattle obtained in the United
States, and when opportunity offered drove them across the
lines; that the plaintiff knew all these circumstances, and kept
the oxen, with full information of their destination, and with an
express view to facilitate their passage to the British troops.
WOODBURY, J., places the decision of the court, in favor of the

defendant, most clearly upon the ground, not of the plaintiff's
mere knowledge of the defendant's illegal intent, but that the
plaintiff took an active part in the illegal transaction, and that the
services performed in tending the cattle were furnished "with an
express design to facilitate their passage over the lines, by keeplag them on the plaintiffs farm in the vicinity of the frontier
till Bailey could call for them with safety." The case furnishes
no intimation of a similar result if the cattle had been kept at 'such
a place and in such a way that nothing relating to their subsequent destination and disposition had entered into and become an
inducement to and a part of the original contract for their support
and keeping.
The case of the Commonwealth v. Harrington,3 Pick. 26, to
which the plaintiff's counsel has called our attention, is a case
where the letting of a house of ill'fame, with the intent of the
lessor that it shall be used for purposes of prostitution, is holden
to be an indictable offense. No question of contract is raised by
tbe case, and it has no application here, other than such as all
those cases have in which the actual intent and design of the party
claiming for the price or hire of the thing sold or leased enters
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into the illegal design and accomplishment of the lessee or purchaser.
In Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. N. P1. 348, where the action was
brought to recover the price of clothes sold to the defendant, and
the defense was that the defendant was a woman of the town,
that this was well known to the plaintiff, and that the clothes were
purchased to enable the defendant to carry on the business of pros-

titution, Lord

ELLENBOROUGH

said: "It must be shown, not only

that the plaintiff had notice, but that he expected to be paid from
the profits of the defendant's prostitution, and that he sold the
clothes to enable her to carry it on, so that he might appear to
have done something in furtherance of it."
See cases cited in
note (pp. 249, 250). See also Cheney v. Duke, 10 Gill & Johns.
11, and Webster v. Munger, before cited.
I am aware of the comparatively recent case of Pearce v. Brooks,
L. R. 1 Ex. 212, decided in 1866. In this case, the plaintiff had
supplied a brougham to a prostitute; and it was held, on the
authority of Cannan v. Bryce, that the knowledge that the
woman was a prostitute being proven, the jury were authorized
in inferring that the plaintiff also knew the purpose for which she
wanted an ornamental brougham, and that this knowledge was
sufficient to render the contract void. But Cannan v. Bryce is
clearly distinguishable from this, and will not support the latter
case; for, says ABBOTT, 0. J., in Cannan v. Bryce, "It will be
recollected that I am speaking of a case wherein the means were
furnished, with a full knowledge of the object to which they were
to be applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishing that
object." Is there no valid distinction? In Cannan v. Bryce the
money was loaned for the purpose of enabling the party to
engage in illegal stock jobbing transactions. If the money had
simply been loaned to a person who, the lender knew, was engaged
in such transactions, and would probably use the money for such
purposes, would the contract be invalid? Money loaned to a
gambler, for the purpose of being staked upon a pending game,
cannot be recovered. Is it the same of money lent to one known
to be a gambler, but concerning which loan and the unlawful
game there is no other connection between the parties than that
which results from a simple borrowing and lending of money?
So a sale of silks and jewels to a prostitute, if it be clearly
shown that such sale was made for the express purpose of rendering her person attractive and seductive, and with the view of
aiding her unlawful commerce, would be an illegal sale; but, shall
the seller of such merchandise be disabled from recovery merely
becuse he knows the buyer to be a prostitute? Is such mere knowledge sufficient to render the contract void? We cannot believe
that public policy requires the exercise of so much scrutiny into
the designs of the purchaser, and the imposition of such restraints
upon ordinary traffic, as the rule, so broadly stated in Pearce v.
Brooks, would seem to imply; and, directly contrary to such
doctrine are the express decisions in Bowrey v. Bennett, I Camp.
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348, Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & P. 347, and Hodgson v.
Temple, before cited.
Moreover, we must not lose sight of the foreign element which
distinguishes the present case from that of Pearce v. Brooks, and
those upon which the latter is predicated; for, in so doing, we
should become unmindful of the great principle controlling the
very question at issue here, namely, the comity which affects the
validity of foreign contracts-a principle which may very properly,
in some cases, require the enforcement of a foreign contract, such as
would not be regarded as valid if made by our own citizens at
home, under a different policy from that prevailing in the place
where the contract was made. Take the common, the invariable,
practice of the recognition and enforcement by the courts of every
State in the Union, of the laws of any and every other State concerning the rate of interest, as an example. Although a contract
made in this State for the payment .of eight or ten per cent.
interest for the loan of money would be regarded as usurious,
unconscionable, corrupt, contrary to public policy, and void, still
our courts would not hesitate to enforce the same contract if mide
in Alabama, or Florida, or California. BELLows, J., Townsend
v. Riley, 46 N. H. 310-313.
This court will and ought to be. reluctant to enforce contracts
manifestly against public policy; but, where the public policy of
- the country is not uniform, but different in neighboring localities,
and variable in all, it would seem to be assuming rather too much
to hold and insist that our own notions of public policy are and
must be infallible, to the exclusion of the opinions and views of
other enlightened communities and the subversion 'of commercial
comity.
Said Mr. Chief Justice BEST, in Richardson v. Hellish, 2 Bing.
242: "I am not much disposed to yield to arguments of public
policy. I think the courts of Westminster Hall (speaking with
deference, as ani humble individual like myself' ought to speak of
the judgments of those who have gone before me) have gone much
further than they were warranted in going, on questions of
policy."
BURROUGHS, J., joined in the protest of the chief justice "against
arguing too strongly upon public policy; it is a very unruly horse,
and when once you get astride it, you never know where it will
carry you. It may lead you from thq sound law. It is never
urged at all but when other points fail."
In Hilton v. Ecekresley, 24 L. J., Q. B. 353, 6 E. & B. 47, the
judges differed in opinion as to what public policy really was in
the case before them; and Lord CAIMPBELL said: "I enter upon
such considerations with much reluctance and with great apprehension, when I think how different generations of judges, and
different judges of the same generation, have differed in opinion
upon questions of political economy and other topics connected
with the jurisdiction of such cases; and I cannot help thinking
that, when there is no illegality in bonds and other instruments at
VOL. XX.-33.
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common law, it would have been better that our courts of justice
had been required to give effect to them, unless where they are
avoided by act of parliament."
To return from this digression: the case of Tracy v. Talmage,
before cited, was considered with very great care. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals, as expressed by SELDEN, J., was evidently
pronounced not until after a most elaborate examination of the
whole subject; but, it being subsequently suggested that "the
court, through a misapprehension of the authorities cited in the
opinion of Judge SELDEN, had fallen into manifest error in its
decision," the case was reargued, and the opinion of the court
affirming the prior decision was afterward given by COMSTOCK, J.
It is apparent that no pains were sparedto make this final examination of the case exhaustive and complete.. The very able argument of counsel and the opinion of the court are both reported at
length in 14 N. Y. 162-218.
It is there insisted by both SELDEN and COMrSTOCK, J J., and
we think conclusively shown, contrary to the suggestion of Judge
METOALr, before referred to, that neither the place of residence of
the original vendor, nor any peculiarity growing out of the matter
of the revenue laws, as connected with the' cases, furnishes the foundation for the principle applied in the class of cases of which JHolman v. Johnson may be regarded as the leader ; but that that class
of cases, like the others, is governed by the same principle, not irreconcilable, but pervading the whole current of the authorities,
namely, that the validity of the plaintiff's claim to recover the
price of goods sold, with knowledge that the purchaser intends to
make an illegal use of them, depends upon the circumstance
whether or not the original vendor participated actively, to a
greater or less extent, in the subsequent unlawful disposition of
the goods, or whether the expectation of advantage to him, growing out of the unlawful disposition of the goods by the purchaser,
entered into and constituted a part of the inducement and consideration of the original sale.
Tracy v. Talmage was a case where the vendor of stocks to a
banking corporation, by the contract of sale, agreed to and did receive therefor, notes, payable on time, which the corporation was
not authorized to make, and from issuing which it was prohibited
under a penalty by statute. Judge SELDEN, after an elaborate review of the authorities, used the following language: "I con
sider it, therefore, as entirely settled by the authorities to which I
have referred, that it is no defense to an action brought to recover
the price of goods sold, that the vendor knew that they were bought
for an illegal purpose, provided it is not !made a part of the contract that they shall be used for that purpose; and provided, also,
that the vendor has done nothing in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design."
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff's general proposition is
sound-that the mere soliciting another to commit an indictable
offense is itself indictable- The State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 267; and,
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also, that the inciting, encouraging, and aiding another to commit
a misdemeanor is itself a misdemeanor-Russ. on Crimes 46, 47 ;
but it is one thing to solicit a person to buy liquors in the ordinary
course of lawful trade, and another and very different thing to solicit
him to sell them in violation of law; see Finc&v. Mfansfield,
before cited. And itis one thing to furnish a person, by means of
a lawful sale and purchase, with articles which the purchaser may
and probably will, apply to an improper use, and another and
very different thing to incite, aid, and encourage the purchaser in
committing an offense against law, with or by means of the
property which he may use for lawful and proper purposes.
It is not spirituous liquors only, but innumerable kinds of
merchandise, which may be applied to improper and unlawful uses.
And it would be wholly impracticable, ag well as unwise and unjust (because restraining to an unreasonable extent the trade and
commerce of the country), to require the 'vendor of all sorts of
merchantable goods to scrutinize the plans and purposes of the
purchaser with regard to the use of the comm~dity, and to sell
only at the peril of forfeiting the price in every case where a jury
might find that the seller had reason to suppose the purchaser intended to make an improper or unlawful use of the article.
Considerations of local policy, of good morals, of the safety of
society, and the protection of our own citizens are not to be disregarded ;but they are to control and make subservient the interests
of commerce and the comity of States, only when these considerations are of unquestionable preeminence. The requirement of
what is too loosely termed public policy must be imperative, admitting of no doubt. Till such be the acknowledged case, the
reason, logic, precedent, and authority of the law must supersede
and ignore any mere system of moral principles, however pure and
attractive, or however efficisnt in the abstract it mayseem, for the
proper regulation-of the actions and manners of men.
Tried by the principles of a code of ethics merely, or by rules of
law subjected to such principles, it would be perilous, for example,
for a man to furnish, on credit, an unscrupulous horse-jockey, or
the dealer in almost innumerable varieties of deleterious, patent
medicines and nostrums, with the means of imposing upon, cheating, and hArming unskilled and credulous people.
But we may illustrate the practical application, of the principle
for which the plaintiff contends, by reference to a great variety of
penal statutes regulating and restraining sales of commodities in
this State.
Take this example: It is provided by law that "all soft biscuit
offered for sale by any baker or other person shall weigh either
four or eight ounces each; and all loaves of soft bread shall be of
the weight of half a pound, one,. two, three or four pounds; and
every loaf or biscuit shall be marked with the weight thereof,"
etc. And if any baker or other person shall offer for sale any soft
biscuit or loaf which does not in weight conform to this requirement, he shall, for each offense, forfeit ten dollars
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A. wholesale dealer in flour has frequently visited his customer's
bakery, and observed the sale of light and unstamped loaves, and,
on one occasion at least, when at the bakery, has virtually solicited
orders for flour; and at the time of such solicitation he has reasonable cause to believe that his purchaser will make small biscuits
and omit the stamps-such orders being subsequently filled-is
there any principle of law so strict and scrupulous as to forbid the
recovery of the price of the flour ?
Shall not the farmer recover the price of milk which he solicits
the retail milk-peddler to purchase of him, if it appears that he has
reasonable cause to believe the peddler's customers too often get
short measure, or measure long enough only because attenuated
by dilution?
Shall the farmer be required to forfeit the price of the hay
which he has sold to another for pressing or exportation, because
he may have reasonable cause to believe the latter will evade the
law which is intended to regulate the pressing and branding of
hay?
And what would we think of a judicial decision which should
prohibit recovery of the price of the enormous quantities of corn,
rye, potatoes and malt which find their way from the granaries of
the Middle and Western States into those distilleries of whisky,
far more numerous and extensive than public policy and the safety
and welfare of the people require?
The case is supposed of burglars' tools, poison, etc., purchased
with the knowledge by the vendor that the articles were intended
for criminal use; and it is said that this is a fair illustration of the
principle; or that, although the cases supposed may differ in shade
from the case now before the court, still, in the language of EyE,
C. J., in Lightfoot v. Tenant, "the body of the color is the same
in all."
We are not inclined to adopt, without qualification, the reasoning of that case, or the conclusion to which it tends. We think
that a person who sells the ordinary subjects of mercantile trade,
and, as is almost universally the usage of the mercantile community, invites, solicits, and urges custom in his line of business, is
not to be identified with the unlawful subsequent use of the articles sold, and subjected to the consequences of prosecution as an
accessory or particepscrininis in the unlawful subsequent sale,
merely because he is not shown to have exercised extreme scrutiny and caution with regard to the ultimate destination and use
of the goods purchased.
We are inclined, instead, to accept the reasoning of Mr. Justice
COMSTOCK with regard to this matter. "The case," he says, "may
be put of poison or a deadly weapon purchased for the purpose of
murder. The offense intended may be of such enormity that no
man having a knowledge of the design can remain neutral, without being, in a just sense, a criminal himself. Where the design
is to violate the fundamental laws of society, a positive duty of intervention may arise to prevent the perpetration of the crime. To
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such cases the rule which we lay down ought not to be applied.
But if the question should ever be thoroughly examined, it will,
I think, be found to have been far too broadly asserted, in respect
to illegal contracts, that the law does not distinguish between acts
criminal in their essential nature, and those which are wrong only
because they are prohibited. This distinction cannot be made
where the contract itself is prohibited, and the question is directly
upon its validity. The inquiry then depends not so much upon
the ethics as the logic of the law, which cannot both affirm and
prohibit the same contract. But in respect to many incidental
questions, the moral feeling and common sense of every man does
discriminate, and so, I apprehend, does the law." 14 Johns. 215.
We do not deem it necessary, however, to base our 6onclusions,
in-this case, upon the distinction alluded, to by Mr. Justice ComsTocK; and we wish it distinctly understood that although "the
moral feeling and common sense of every man does discriminat6,"
yet we do understand that there is no valid distinction in the application of the law upon this subject between mala prohibitaand
mala in se, and that, if it were ever regarded, it has been wholly
laid aside in the decision of the later English cases.
But with respect to the application of the doctrine for which the
plaintiff here contends, as tested by the illustrations taken from
our own statutes regulating the sale of various commodities, the
language of Mr. Chief Justice EYRE may be appropriately applied,
although the cases used for illustration differ in shade fr6m the
case now before us--" the body of the color is the same in all."
The precise question now before us has recently been considered
by the Circuit Court of the United States for the dintrict of Massachusetts, in the case of Greene et al. *. Collins, Mass. District,
Oct., 1870 ; and the decision of the court is in full accord with the
views which we have expressed. CLIFFORD, J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, remarks as follows: "Marked differences of
opinion are obiervable in the determination ot courts of justice,
where the facts were, in most respects, the same as in the case before the court; but the better opinion appears to be, that the mere
knowledge by the vendor that the vendee, at the time of the purchase of property, intends to use it for an illegal purpose, will 'not,
as a general rule, prevent the vendor from recovering from the
vendee the value of the property. Exceptional cases may arise in
which a different rule must be applied, as where the property purchased is intended fo; treasonable purposes, or to commit murder,
or to promote some other offense of such enormity, and so violative
of the fundamental laws of society, that silence on the part of the
citizen is itself a crime, or would be evidence tending to show that
the seller was an accessory, before the fact, to the commission of
the offense. Many cases may doubtless be cited where it is held
that a contract cannot be enforced which contemplates what the
law forbids, whether the act forbidden be malu¢ in se or only
malum prohibitum; but those cases do not apply to a contract of
sale which is valid by the law of the place where it is made, and
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where the only circumstance imputed as affecting its validity is
the mere fact that the seller knows or had reason to believe that
the purchaser intended to remove the property purchased into another jurisdiction, and to sell it there in violation of the law of that
jurisdiction. U. S. Bank v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527; Harrisv. Runnels, 12 How. 79; Kennett v. Chambers, 14 Row. 38. Such exceptional cases may doubtless arise; but the general rule, and the
one by which this case must be governed, is, that in an action to
recover the price of goods sold, it is no defense that the vendor
knew that they were purchased to be sold in another jurisdiction in violation of the law of that jurisdiction, provided it was not
a part of the contract that they should be used for that purpose,
and provided, also, that the vendor neither did nor agreed to do
anything in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design beyond the
mere sale with knowledge of the intent of the purchaser."
The very elaborate and exhaustive opinion of Mr. Justice CLiFFORD, in Greene v. Collins, contains a summary and review of
many of the authorities to which allusion has now been made.
And concerning them, the learned judge remarks: " Cases very
nearly allied, it must be admitted, have been differently decided;
but if they are carefully examined and compared one with another,
the particular features by which they were distinguished are, with
few exceptions, plain to be seen." And he points out, by way
of illustration, certain expressions in Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray
587, indicating that the organ of the court on that occasion was of
opinion that a sale made with knowledge of the seller that the
purchaser intended to use the thing sold, in: violation of law, was
illegal and void, irrespective of the question whether it was an
ingredient of the contract that the goods should be sold, or that
the seller should do any act to assist or facilitate the intended illegal use or sale; but, he remarks: "The expression of such views
was not necessary to the decision of the case; as the statement
shows not merely that the plaintiff had knowledge of the illegal
purpose of the defendant, but that he sold with reference to it, and
for the purpose of enabling the purchaser to effect it; and the
court, here, agrees with that court in the conclusion that the instructions given in that case, if -viewed in that light, were thoroughly sound in principle, and that they do not conflict with the
cases decided. Unless viewed in that light, the decision is directly
opposed to the rule laid down in the case of Sortwell v. Hughes,
1 Curt. 245, decided by Judge CURTIS, and which is an authority
in this circuit, and in the judgment of this co'urt expresses the true
rule upon the subject."
In addition to the authorities already cited, the following cases
will be found to sustain the views now expressed: Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 15, 47 ; Story's Conflict Laws, § 253; Mc Conihe
v. MfcMann, 27 Vt. 95; Baccman v. Wright, ib. 187; Jameson
v. Gregory, 4 Met. (Ky.) 363; Bligh v. James, 6 Allen 572;
and Soriwell v. Hughes, 1 Curt. 245, cited by CLIFFORD, J., ante,
in which Judge CURTIs uses the following language: "The other
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ground of defense is, that if there were not a sale in New Hampshire, the property was sold by the plaintiffs with a knowledge
the defendant intended to sell it in violation of the law of New
Hampshire; and no recovery can be had according to the law of
that State.
"Having come to the conclusion that these sales were not made
in New Hampshire, and it not appearing that the plaintiffs in any
way participated in the defendant's sales, or did anything except
to. sell the property in the usual course of their business, the case
of Holman v. Johnson, Cowper 341, is directly in point to show
that a recovery may be had. I am not aware that this case has
been overruled in England; though the extension of the principle to a sale in England, in the. case of Hodgson v. Temple, 5
Taunt. 181, has been much questioned. (lope v. .Rowlands, 2 A.
& W. 149 ; Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593 ; Cannanv.Bryce,
3 B. & Ald. 179. * * * I am inclined.to the opinion, therefore, that I should take the same view of this case, if I were to
decide it according to my own judgment of what the law is, as
was taken in Holman v. Johnson; but I am relieved from this
necessity by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Harris v. Runnels,-12 How. 79. This decision goes
even further than. Hodgson v. Temple, and holds that where the
sale was an offense by reason of a statute, but the act itself was
not immoral, and the sale itse'lf was not declared void by the
statute, there was no implication, from the mere infliction of the
penalty, that the contract was forbidden, and so void. I found
myself unable to unite' in the opinion in that case, but I am bound
by it. A fortiori,upon the principles of that decision there is no
implication that the statute forbids a sale'in another State to a
person who intends to bring the property into New Hampsire and
there sell it contrary to the law of the State, and no principle of
the common law which renders such a sale illegal and void."
Our conclusion will have been anticipated; but it is proper
to make a brief practical application of the foregoing considerations.
Stewart resided in New York, and carried on there a lawful
business. In the regular course of trade he filled orders, for
liquors, selling and delivering them in the State of New York, as
he might lawfully do. But, when he sold these liquors, he had
reason to believe, and did believe, that Einerson intended to re-sell
them in New Hampshire; and, doing business here, he was bound
to take notice that such re-sale of the liquors by Emerson here
would be unlawful. Still, it seems to us too clearly settled to be
disputed, that the contract of sale was not invalidated by reason
of Stewart'A mere knowledge of Emerson's unlawful designs.
Stewart's offense, then, which is said to taint and corrupt- the
contract of original sale, consists .solely in solicitinq the purchase
of these liquors, with knowledge that, if purchased, Emerson
would be likely to re-sell them contrary to law.
But Stewart did not solicit such a disposition of the liquors by
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Emerson ; the liquors were not sold to him with a view to such
disposition, or to any disposition of them by Emerson. Stewart
neither derived nor contemplated any advantage from Emerson's
unlawful dealings with the goods; the payment for them was not
dependent upon, nor the price enhanced'by, any considerations
relating to Emerson's use of them. His solicitation was that of
traders in their general practice, as expressed in their advertisements and circulars-" Your patronage is respectfully solicited,"
-and Stewart's connection with the matter terminated with the
delivery of the goods to Emerson's agent in New York.
We are of the opinion that this solicitation, accompanied by
the vendor's knowledge of Emerson's course of business, and his
belief that these liquors would probably be disposed of in accordance with that course of business, does not bring the case within
the rule whereby contracts affected by illegal considerations have
been invalidated, nor, as we think, does it come within the principle which lies at the foundation of those wholesome maxims of
the law which this plaintiff has invoked; none of which are infringed or sought to be impaired by this decision.
Moreover, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there is no evidence, and of course there can be no presumption in law (but
rather the contrary), that these liquors were re-sold by Emerson
at all. They may have been used, contrary to the original intent
of the purchaser, for personal or family use, or for lawful chemical or mechanical purposes, by the vendee, or they may have been
taken by him to a State where the sale of such goods was not
prohibited by law.
"Intention," says Mr. Justice SMITH, in Bell v. Woodward, 47
N. H. 540, "is subject to change; and a naked intention, where
no act has been done, is not admissible as tending to show a probability that the intention will thereafter be carried into effect."
We are bound to look at the contract alone, quite independent
of subsequent .transactions growing out of it. The contract was
ended when Stewart delivered the goods; and subsequent dealings
with the property by Emerson or others, either in furtherance of
or contrary to the original design of the purchaser, cannot relate
back to the original sale, and make that illegal which, at the conclusion of the original contract, was not illegal.
Suppose the vendor understands that the vendee wants the
liquor for an honest and lawful purpose. Still he puts into his
hands the means of violating the law. The buyer, in fact, intends
to, and does, violate the law. Clearly, the sale would be legal
and valid. Shall the vendor's misunderstanding of the purchaser's intentions, then, taint the original contract by retroaction ?
Suppose again, that, for the sake of argument, we concede that
mere knowledge of an existing intention to violate the law by the
purchaser renders the contracts of sale void. The illegal sale by
the original vendor is made; the contract is ended; it is a void
contract. But the purchaser changes his mind, becomes converted
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to the wholesome doctrine of temperance, and destroys the liquor,
or uses it for lawful purposes' Does the subsequent diversion of
purpose by the purchaser relate back to the original contract, so
that now the original vendor can invoke our aid to recover the
price fixed by the original invalid and unlawful sale?
Not only upon authority, but upon correct principle, we are
compelled to disallow the plaintiff's positions. The substance of
the decision in Smith v. Godfrey is, that the vendor's claim to
recover for the price of spirituous liquors, sold with knowledge of
the purchaser's intention to re-sell them contrary to law, will not
be denied, unless it be "an ingredient in the contract that the
goods shall be illegally sold, or that the seller shall do some act to
assist or facilitate the illegal sale."
The present case does not- differ from that, unless the mere
solicitation by Stewart shall be regarded as an ingredient in the
contract that the goods shall be illegally sold, or unless such mere
solicitation shall be considered an act assisting or facilitating subsequent illegal sale.
The term solicitation,here, cannot have any forced or usual
meaning. There is scarcely ever a sale and purchase among traders,
without solicitation by the seller. We are unable to regard the
circumstances of such solicitation as of any importance whatever,
as affecting the subsequent contract of sale by Stewart, much less
the later disposition of the goods by Emerson.
It has.been urged in argument, that the moral sense of this community requires us to place this case within the exception to the
rule of comity which is ordinarily applied to foreign contracts,
and to apply to the sale of spirituous liquors the phiuciple which
should be applied in the case of the sale of a deadly%poison to a
murderer, with knowledge of his intentions.
We have hao disposition to discountenance or oppose the doctrine
of the immorality or the positive sinfulness of the indiscriminate
sale of spirituous liquors, even if this were, as it is not, the appropriate place or tribunal for considerations of this character. But
the remedy for the suppression of intemperance cannot be afforded
by courts of law, at the sacrifice and violation of established legal
principles and rules. The philanthropy of the courts is not to be
exemplified by despotism and the exercise of arbitrary power.
Courts act in the forms and by the rules of law, expressed by
legislative will; and when the plaintiff, here, tells us that the
course of legislation in this State, by its expression of repugnance
to the traffic in spirituous liquors, calls upon us, by judicial power,
to annul this contract, we cannot agree with him; but our reply
is, such legislative expression is not given. Year after year, and
step by step, the legislators of this State have proceeded with
their enactments relative to intemperance and the sale of intoxicating drinks, mindful of the course of legislation in neighboring
commonwealths, borrowing here a little and there a little from the
laws of other jurisdictions; avoiding, likewise, in some instances,
the example of other legislators.
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Zealous reformers, constantly agitating this subject, cannot
have been unmindful of the legislation, heretofore alluded to, in
Massachusetts and Connecticut, whereby such a sale as this was
there made ineffectual, by force of express law.
Nothing could have beeii easier or simpler than for our legisl,tors to have said, if such had been their will, or such, in their
judgment, the will or desire of their constituents, "No action of
any kind shall be had or maintained in any court for the price of
any spirituous or intoxicating liquor sold in any other State for
the purpose of being brought into this State, to be here kept or
sold in violation of law, under such circumstances that the vendor
would have reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser entertained such illegal purpose." But they did not say it, as Massachusetts and Connecticut did; and having seen fit to stop short of
this point in the progress of reform, it cannot be required of the
courts that they should go further than the law-makers themselves,
and usurp their legitimate functions.
It cannot be said that the public policy of this State forbids the
enforcement of this contract, and approves the gross immorality
and dishonesty which alone could prompt such a defense, when
made by the purchaser.
In Massachusetts, as we have seen, the mandate of legislative
power was laid upon the courts, with respect to contracts like
this; and willingly obedient thereto, such contracts were declared
illegal, and parties seeking their enforcement were turned out of
court. In 1868 the mandate was withdrawn, the statute of 1855
was repealed, the common law revived, and then the vendor of
goods, in a State where the sale was lawful, came to the courts of
Massachusetts to recover under such a contract, and under exactly
such circumstances as surround the present case, and bad his claim
allowed.
This court, it is to be presumed, will not be reluctant to execute
the laws in the 'spirit of their purpose and intent. We sit here not
to do our own will, nor to make laws; nor to administer them
according to our own notions, but by prescribed rules.
The legislature may interfere, if the public good demands more
stringent laws. Such enactments as we have referred to in Massachusetts and Connecticut do not, in any degree, conflict with
any of those constitutional principles which are established for the
protection of private rights or private property. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations 596, 597; Webster v. Munger, before cited;
Beynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 1't9.
But so long as the people do not thus express their will, through
the forms of constitutional legislation, we are bound to adhere to
the principles which lie at the foundation of our commercial prosperity, and to admit no case within the exception to the rule which
those principles have established, unless the demand is enforced
by stronger considerations than the present case presents to our
minds.
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Our conclusion is that there was no error in the refusal to give
to the jury the instructions desired by the plaintiff.
Judgment on the verdict.
BE.Lows, 0. J.,
SARGENT, DoE. and LADD, J J., concurred.
and SMITH, J., dissented.
We are glad ofanopportunityofpre- acting upon the principles before
senting the foregoing ease to our read- stated. Story Conflict oflaws §f 258,259.
ers. The fact that the court, after such etc. Warrenderv. Warrender,9Blgh
cafeful examination and deliberation, Ho. Lds. Reports 111, 112, arguendo by
were so nearly equally dqvided, as the judges. But it will scarcely be
nearly as they could have been, and claimed by any one, much conversant
still decide the case, shows,very satis- with legal subjects, that there exists
factorily, how near the line of division any such general and universal abthe case really comes. It is a case horrence against the use or the traffic In
which, in our humble appreciation, spirits and.wines, as to bring it within
might have been decided elthgr way, the range of a clearly deflne4 imwithout violence either to the princi- morality, independent-of express legis.
ples introduced or to the decided cases. lation. There may be some-unquesThe principles involved In the decis- tionablythere are some--whose views
Ion are not much in controversy. It upon general questions notaffectedby
has long been familiar law, that the any, Idiosyncrasy upon this eubjec%
validity and' interpretation of con- would be esteemed entirely pound and
tracts must be governed by the law of rational, who, pevertheless, find it imthe place where such contracts are possible to accept the general feelings
made. Story Conflict of Laws, f 24t2; of tolerance upon this particular sub.
and that contracts valid by the law of ject and who, consequexntly, would rethe place where made are, as a general volt at the Idea of regardlng the traffic
rule, valid and to be upheld and en- in spirits and vines, as any less imforced everywhere. The exceptions to moral than the traffic in slaves, or in
this ruie are such as obtain Jure the implements of professional gam-gentfum; (1) in favor of morality and bling, or In devices for the accomplish.
decency; (2) in support and vindiea- ment of murder or robbery. But such
tion of the policy of the particular cases are, at present, probably rather
State or country in whose courts the exceptional than general; too infrecontiact is 'sought to be enforced. quent to form the basis of judicial
Story Conflict of Laws §§ 244, 245, 240. action even in the most advanced
Thus a contract made in fulfillment communities.
We must then fall back upon the
of any arrangement for the practice or
creation of crime, in'thestrict and uni- positive law of the State where the
versal sense of all civilized and contract Is sought to be enforoed.
Christian nationstas, for instance, con- These laws for the regulation of the
tracts in aid of the practice of murder, traffic in spirits and wines, whether
robbery and theft, or of adultery, prohibitory or merely regulative, 1hhve
incest and polygamy, and multitudes attained a character, in this portion of
of other similar offenses, universally our country at least, quite above that
recognized by all nations claiming re- of mere revenue restrictions. They
cognition under the terms already unquestionably partake largely of
used, as offenses against the universal, police regulations, and are as much
sense of right and decency, could not and as clearly entitled to strict enforcebe enforced in the courts of such ment, as a part of the settled policy of
countries, without affording a per- the State, as any other enactments of
nicious example to their own people, the -legislature. No contract, thereSuch contracts, therefore, although fore, wherever made, which involves
made in countries where no such sense in the remotest sense or degreethe viof abhorrence existed, where such pluc- latlon of such laws, could fairly claim
tices might be tolerated, or even com- any allowance in the courts of the
mended, as may have been the fact State whose laws are thus attempted
sometimes, could not form the basis of tobeinfringed.
an action in the courts of countries The case of Eoiman v. Johnoin, Cowp.
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341, has become the leading and funda- sign, when such commodity is still fur.
mental case upon this point. It has nished.
been questioned and criticised, but Many very able writers and some
never fully set aside. Biggs v. Law- judgeshaveclaimedtoextendthesame
rence, 3 T. R. 2U; Steele v. Carle, 4 Dana rule of construction to all cases where
S5. It may, perhaps, be safe to affirm, the means of violating any positive
as was said in Biggs v. Lawrence, supra, law of a foreign country is furnished.
that it "comes up to the utmost limit There can be no questionthisis taking
of sound doctrine." And Ifitwere not higher and more satisfactory ground
for the fact that it concerns a matter than any other, and for one we should
of mere revenue or positive law, feel quite content to have the courts
where no great question of universal left to themselves upon this higher
moral sense was involved, we should level ofmoral teaching. Wehavesome.
feel disposed to say that Hiolman v. times hoped for it; but that was when
.ohnson goes too fair. One who fur- we expected many other things, which
nishes another with the means of com- the spirit of trade and commerce will
mitting crime, although it may be only not yet tolerate. And we think we can
to tlhddetrimentofhimselfand faimily, see some reason why this distinction in
knowing the use to which such means construction between aiding in the
will be applied, must be regarded as in commission of a gross immorality in
some sense particeps criminis. It has another State, and the mere silent acbeen sometimes said that there is no quiescence in another violating a mere
difference in this respect between police regulation, in a foreign, State,
offenses maluin in se and those which should obtain. In strictness, perhaps,
are merely malum prohibitum. The as matter ofevidence, the act of selling,
difference is unquestionably less than with knowledge of the probable use to
was formerly considered. But still, in which the thing sold will be applied,
some respects, there is a difference, must depend upon the duty of the
No man can be justified in rendering party. In the case of carrying on a lethe remotest aid to another in com- gitimate traffic in a foreign State, the
mitting an offense against the univer- restrictive enactments of our own State
sally recognized canons of morality in prescribing to our own citizens the
and decency. He has noright to place mode in which the same business is to
himself in any position where the exi- be here conducted, must be considered
gencies of business or trade will re- as less obligatoiy than are the univerquire him to do any act tending in the sallaws ofmoralityand decency. These
remotest degree toward the commis- latter are obhgatory everywhere, in all
sion of an immorality. He is, in fact, times, and under all skies; not dependbound to conduct all trade and busi- ent upon State lines or State laws. But
ness upon the plkn of offering no mo- the former have no binding obligation
tive to immorality to any one; and if except within the limits of the State
he knows of any one so disposed, to enacting them. Hence when the party
withhold from him the means of its merely pursues the legitimate course
accomplishment. One who has re- of his own business, in his own State,
solved to commit an immorality is to he is laid under no obligation with rebe regarded as unsound in mind, and ference to 'the police laws of other
entitled to demand the aid of his States. They have no binding force or
fellows in withholding from him the obligation upon him. He is, therefore,
means of his own destruction. It can violating no incumbent duty so long as
never be regarded as fairly within the he does nothing intended or calculated
legitimate range of allowable traffic to forward the violation of those laws
for one to furnish another with the within the limits of the States where
means of self-destruction or the de- enacted. His mere knowledge that
struction of others, or of any of the some other one may use his lawful
universally recognized interests of commodities in an unlawful mode in
society. Hence, in such cases, the law the foreign State, seems to be no violaregards knowledge, and mere know- tion ofpres6ut obligation.
ledgeoftheintenttousethecommodity
Butthe nomenthc goes beyond the
unlawfully, as legal evidence tending lawful demands of his own business,
to prove connivance at, and partieipa- and attempts to aid another, but in the
tion in, the unlawful purpose and de- remotest degree, in accomplishing the
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violatio- of the positive laws of his
own State, he is justly regarded a participator in the offense thus forwarded,
and he cannot dbmand the aid of the
courts of that State for his deliverance.
The true line of demarcation seems to
be, that the dealer in spirits and wines
in a foreign State, so long as he keeps
legitimately to his own business, and
within the limits of his own State, is
not chargeable with fault The foreign
State may lawfully make its own enactments in regard to the conduct of
the business within its own limits, and
may properly insist that no one shall
make use of its own territory to infringe these laws. But if foreign dealers come within the State, either per.
sonally or through their agents, or by
correspondence, or in any other mode,
all sales thus effected, either in whole
or in part, In our view of the law, are
tainted with illegality, and cannot be
enforced in the courts of that State,
and ought not to be anywhere. The
doctrine of the Supreme Court of Maine
in Wilson v. STaa n, 47 Me. 120, where
they characterize these practices, as
amounting to the seduction of their
citizens into illegal traffic in violation
of the laws of their own State, seems to
us eminentlyjust and reasonable. And
the reasoning of Mr. Justice TaomAS,
In Webser v. Munger, 8 Gray 53, seems
tojustify thesameview. And the opin-

Ion of Mr. Justice C=rvoim, in Greene
V. CbLins, supra, seems entirely consistent with this view.
The facts in the present case would
seem, upon the basis thus laid down, to
lead to the conclusion that these sales
were tainted with illegality; since the
creditor came within the State, and
theresolicited sales, and such solicitation must be regarded as effective, to
some extent certainly, in producing the
actual sales thereafter made,. and thus
rendered him a participator in the violation of the law of New Hampshire.
It is not important how much or how
little beyond the fact of mere knowledge the sellermay do to effect the vio.lation of the law. In charity to his own
rights,, mere knowledge is not construed as implying participation. He
might have that forced upon him, and
not bein fault. But he could not go to
New Hampshire, and there solicit sales
in like innocence. But the case is so
nearly in a precise equipoise, that no
one need feel surprised at the result.
It may possibly be in consonance
with the weight of authority, and especially in this country. It certainly
seemed so tous upon first examination;
but upon further study and reflection,
we feel that if it were left with us, we
should feel compelled to come to the
conclusion before inillated.
LF.R.

Sapreme Court of Michigan.
JACOB DEFOE '. THE PEOPLE.
A defendant on trial for an intent to commit a rape, having made a statement
under the statute, that "all the allegations of the prosecution are false and un.
true, and that he had never insulted her In his life," it is error for the cohrt to
charge thejury that "the statement of defendant does not, however, di.
reetly deny the assault. This silence would go far to confirm the testimony of
the plaintiff." His assertion that ,"allher allegations "-of which the assault
was one-were false and untrue, was a direct denial of the assault.
The "statement" of a defendant, on trial for a criminal offense, when be
chooses to make one, may be considered by the jury, in view of all the circum.
stances which may affect its credit; nor can he claim any protection from the
effect of significant omissions, on the ground that he is not required to criminate himself.

ERnoR to Eaton circuit.
Shaw & -Pennington,for plaintiff in error.
Dwight May, Attorney General, and W. M
ants in error.

Brown, for defend-
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CURTISrANCY, J.-The charge in the information was of an
assault with the intent to commit a rape. The prosecutrix gave
evidence tending to show an assault with the intent charged, by
the defendant, who was a physician, and that it took place in his
room or office while, as such physician, he was treating her arm for
some malady for which she had several times been treated by
him at the same place.
Her evidence was not confirmed by that of any other witness
as to any of the more important facts going to establish the truth
of the charge; but was contradicted as to several important circumstances by other witnesses.
The defendant on the trial, as permitted by the statute, made a
statement in his own behalf, of the facts and circumstances on the
occasion alluded to by the prosecutrix, as he claimed them to be.
This, as stated inthe bill of exceptions, was, so far as material to
be noticed here, as follows: "And defendant's counsel further
gave in evidence, by the statement of the defendant in said cause,
that all the allegations of prosecutrix were false and untrue," and
"that he never insulted her in his life."
The court, in his charge to the jury, after some comments upon
defendant's statement, which are admitted to have been fair and
correct, added the following, which is complained of as erroneous:
"The statement of defendant does not, however, directly deny the
assault. This silence would go far to confirm the testimony of the
complainant."
If, as we are bound to assume, the bill of exceptions correctly
sets forth the defendant's "statement," and its effect, that "all the
allegations of the prosecutrix were false and untrue," and that "he
never insulted her in his life," then this part of the charge was
certainly erroneous, in assuming as a fact what the bill of exceptions shows not to have been as thus assumed.
The direct denial that "he bad never insulted her in his life"
must certainly be regarded in the connection in which it Is found
and with reference to her testimony, as a direct denial of the assault
which her testimony tended to prove. And if his statement
tended to show that "all her allegations" (of which the assault
was one), were false and untrue, this was a clear and sufficiently
direct denial of the assault.
Had the record, however, confirmed the omission of the denial
assumed as a fact in the charge, we are not prepared to agree
with the counsel for the plaintiff in error that such omission could
have no tendency to confirm the testimony of the prosecutrix in
reference to the assault.
The statement of a prisoner in such a case, does not stand upon
the same ground, and is not to be governed by the same considerations in this respect, as the testimony of a witness refusing to
answer a question which might criminate himself.
The statement is not upon oath. It is optional with the
prisoner whether he will avail himself of the privilege of making
any statement at all. If he choose to decline making any state-
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ment, no inference is to be drawn against him for the omission.
But as it may be presumed that he will only elect to make a
statement when he believes it will operate in his favor, and he is
under the strongest temptation to make it as favorable to himself
as he can, without running the risk of being disbelieved, and the
jury, as we have already held, may give it such credence as they
may think it is entitled to, even in opposition to sworn testimony,
it is of the utmost importance that the jury should be allowed to
test its credibility by a full and critical examination, its consistency
or inconsistency with the circumstances of the case which are
satisfactorily proved, by the consideration whether it is apparently
full, frank, and without reserve, or evasive as. to important facts.
which must have been within his knowledge, or confined to some
comparatively unimportant circumstances; orto those upon which he.
could not be contradicted if false. And in determining the credit.
to which they may think it entitled, they are not to be precluded
by any artificial rule from giving full weight to every consideration, or to any feature of such statement which may tend in
any way. to produce belief or disbelief, either of the statement itself or of the evidence of witnesses to which it relates.
Such statement -may be just as significant in what it omits as in
what it contains: and its omissions, as well as its contents, may
tend to corroborate or impair, the effect of the testimony upon
which it may happen to bear: and the jury have a right to give
it such weight in this, and all other respects, as, under all the circumstances of the case, they may think it entitled to: and it cannot, therefore, be erroneous in the court to instruct them that they
have such right.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
SOHOOL BOARD V. JOHN 3. HAOKNA1.
An act of the Legislature authorizing private property to be taken for a pub11o school-house site is not in conflict with the provision of the Constjtution
which prohibits the taking of private property except for public use. In tbis
oase the use, though local, is public.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court
H. B. Johnson for the School Board.
Geo. T. White for Hackman.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CuRRina J.-This was a proceeding under the statute (Wag. St.,
1244 and 1247, §§ 12 and 26;. ib. 326-27, §§ 3, 4) for the condetnation of land for a public school-house site. The constitutionality of the law authorizing such condemnation is called in
question; and its invalidity, as in conflict with section 16, article
1, of the Constitution, is insisted upon as a ground for overturn-
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ing the judgment of the court below. This is the main matter
urged against the action of the Circuit Court.
The ground is taken that the appropriation of property for the
use of a local school district is not an appropriation of it to. ap1b_
lie use. This theory is based upon the notion that the proposed
use is local and limited, and not for the benefit of the public generally. On this subject POLAND J., in Williams v. School District
No. 6, 33 Vt. 271 makes the following observations: "Every
public use is, to some extent, local, and benefits a particular section more than others. Railroads and canals, the most extensive
Burying-grounds,
of our public works, do so in some degree.
aqueducts, mills, and many highways, are as purely local as this,
and nobody can derive benefit from them except by becoming a
resident in their vicinity. In the same way this may be for the
benefit of any citizen. But the use in the present case (that of a
public school-house) has a more enlarged and liberal view. It is
a benefit and advantage to the whole country that all the children
should be educated, and thus any means of educating the children
in a single district benefits the whole. To accomplish this great
object of educating the whole, it becomes necessary that a great
number of schools should be supported to make them accessible to
all; but the principle remains the same, as if all the children of
the State could attend a single school; they are all but separate
means to accomplish the same great and general benefit."
I concur in these views and adopt them as my own, and am
consequently of the opinion that the objection taken to the constitutionality of the law in question is not well founded. In the
case above cited the subject of taking private property for the public use is exhaustively examined, the prior decisions reviewed, and
See also
the whole matter placed in a clear and strong light.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, page 530 and following.
The process of condemnation, in the case now before the court,
was conducted with observable care and circumspection. The provisions of the statute, governing the proceedings, appear to have
been consulted and scrupulously followed. I see no substantial
objection to them, although they have encountered close, if not
captious, criticism. The petition to the Circuit Court for the appointment of commissioners was, in the outset, assailed by a demurrer, but the demurrer was overruled and subsequently, in effect,
abandoned, although the questions sought to be raised by it have
been argued here. When the demurrer was overruled, the defendant answered upon the merits, and thereby practically withdrew
the demurrer, and waived all technical objections to the petition.
Pick-ney v. Mississippi Valley Telegraph Company, 47 Mo.
There is no motion in arrest to test its sufficiency in mat459.
ter of substance.
Commissioners were appointed in accordance with the prayer
of the petition, who in due time returned into court their report
to which no exceptions, as contemplated by the statute, were taken
(1 Wag. St. 328 § 4). Subsequently to the confirnmation of the

